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ABSTRACT
Humans and nonhuman animals categorize the natural world, and their behaviors
can reveal how they use the stimulus information they encounter in service of these
categorizations. Rigorous psychological study of categorization has offered many insights
into the processes of categorization and their relative strengths and weaknesses across
species. Probabilistic categorization, in which the relationships among stimulus
information and category membership that are observed by an individual are
fundamentally probabilistic, presents unique challenges both to the categorizer and to the
psychologist attempting to model their behavior. Challenges notwithstanding,
probabilistic categorization is an exceptionally ecologically relevant problem to human
and nonhuman animal cognition alike. This dissertation reports the effects of many
manipulations of theoretical interest on computer-trained rhesus macaques’ and

capuchin monkeys’ inferred cognitive strategy use in a computerized version of a classic
probabilistic categorization task. Experiment 1 probed cognitive strategy use across five
variants of the same task in which the probability structure was constant, but the
appearances and onscreen locations of cues and responses changed. Experiment 2
presented a series of manipulations of theoretical interest to the animals by changing the
probability and reward structures of the task. Experiment 3 manipulated the stimuli of
the task in ways motivated by findings across perceptual psychology literature.
Experiment 4 extended the reward rate manipulations of Experiment 2 even further.
Across four experiments, inferred strategy use was remarkably stable. Those animals that
used cue-based strategies often returned to the same specific strategy experiment after
experiment, as the cues, responses, probabilities, and contingencies changed around
them. This finding is discussed in relation to questions of a real or functional ceiling on
sophistication of strategy use, the robustness of cognitive individual differences in
nonhuman primates, and future directions for comparative study of cognitive strategy use
in probabilistic categorization.
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1
1

INTRODUCTION

The relationships among minds, behaviors, and environments are fundamentally
uncertain, and in many ways the cognitive competencies of mind can be understood as
specific adaptations that serve to mediate this uncertainty (Glimcher, 2005). For
example, the structure of many behavioral economic games is such that one or more
players attempts to maximize the unpredictability of their responses as observed by other
players (e.g., Rapoport & Budescu, 1992). Likewise, the structure of complex nervous
systems are such that neuronal activity and neurotransmitter release are probabilistic
events (Stevens, 2003). Cognitive scientists need not appeal to such evolutionarily
ultimate or neuroscientifically molecular processes to find unpredictability in animal
brains and behaviors, as the stimulus environments we interact with daily do not present
us with transparent, deterministic, causal relationships.
A mind’s transformation of the uncertainty of the environment into discrete
representations, decisions, and behaviors is termed inference. Inference from
probabilistic evidence is a key feature of human and nonhuman animal (hereafter:
animal) life. A jury can only be uncertain as to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but they
can make an informed inference via physical evidence, witness testimony, and reasonable
doubt. The new restaurant on the corner may be delicious or nauseating, but inference
from online reviews, a health inspector’s report, and word of mouth can rapidly clarify
the relative likelihood of food poisoning. A hungry monkey faces a similar dilemma, when
a nearby fungus might be a poisonous toadstool or an edible mushroom. The relative
probabilities of fitness advantage and disadvantage that might be won by consuming the
fungus must be evaluated amidst considerable uncertainty and nontrivial stakes.
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One way to describe this practice of inference is by using principles of probability
theory, especially the rearrangement of conditional probabilities described by Bayes’ rule
(Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018). Bayes’ rule offers a straightforward way to synthesize
probabilistic information into a form that is useful to a decision-maker: it is the
probability that one event will occur over another, or that one hypothesis will be
supported versus another. Interestingly, to cognitive psychologists, normative human
behavior does not typically reflect these calculations in any straightforward way (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, there are other ways, beyond differing from Bayesian
computation, in which inferences of humans and other species are not so sterile as
probability theory might suggest. Adult humans (Washburn et al., 2005), human children
(Beran et al., 2012), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Beran et al., 2015), orangutans (genus
Pongo; Marsh & MacDonald, 2012), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta; Tu et al., 2015),
Guinea baboons (Papio papio; Malassis et al., 2015), a dolphin (Tursiops truncatus;
Smith, 2010), and rats (Rattus norvegicus; Foote & Crystal, 2007) are among the
populations that have demonstrated the ability to behave in accordance with recognition
of their own uncertainty.
At least for humans, this relationship with uncertainty is fraught. Objectively, there
are few situations in which it is adaptive to be underinformed about the contingencies of
one’s environment. But subjectively, the story is not so clear. On one hand, live events like
sports are uniquely profitable entertainment (with 89 of the 100 most watched broadcasts
in the United States in 2018 related to live sports), in no small part because their contents
are fundamentally uncertain (Crupi, 2019). On the other hand, and less trivially,
individuals at risk of high trait anxiety or clinically significant anxiety disorders are
intolerant of the subjective feeling of not knowing that comes with such uncertainty
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(Carleton et al., 2007). These examples are expository only, and scarcely scratch the
surface of how probability and psychological processes intersect. Uncertainty is, to a large
or small degree, explicitly or implicitly, a component of any psychological process
concerned with information (Garner, 1962).
This dissertation will describe the strategies that species use when identifying
objects (categorizing a stimulus into one or many unique psychological groups) and
coordinating behavior on the basis of such judgments (engaging in decision-making by
using the external and internal stimulus information at its disposal to guide behavior) in
service of probabilistic inference. I will use this introductory chapter to catalog previous
research on the cognitions and behaviors that are characteristic of categorization and
decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. Next, I will introduce one specific
methodology for bringing into the psychology laboratory the types of probabilistic
categorization and decision-making that organisms face in their environments, discuss
what this methodology has already contributed to our understanding of such constructs,
and identify its limitations. In the second chapter, I will present a role for comparative
psychology in answering a number of outstanding questions about probabilistic
categorization, alongside discussion of species-specific considerations that suggest a
match between mechanisms of probabilistic categorization and the cognitive
competencies of New World and Old World monkeys. Further chapters will describe a set
of experiments that probed the degree to which these characteristic cognitions and
behaviors are specific to the stimulus properties and/or embedded probabilities of
previously published experiments, the results of these experiments, and implications for
the comparative study of how cognition intersects with chance.
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1.1

Probabilistic Categorization
Very high categorization performance must be required of humans and nonhuman

animals in their natural habitats, where dangerous predators cannot be mistaken as
benign and new chances to elect political officials in the United States come only every
two to six years (Ashby & Ennis, 2006; Kruschke, 2005; Smith, 2014). Psychologists often
present relationships between psychological inputs and their observable outputs as if they
were deterministic: an organism that perfectly used the information at its disposal would
unerringly predict the toxicity of a mushroom or the danger posed by a large animal's
silhouette (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Indeed, three of the four major classes of
categorization experiments identified by Ashby and Ell (2001) model relationships of this
kind. In the first, rule-based tasks, including the influential Wisconsin Card Sort Task, an
explicit, verbally declarable stimulus dimensions or some conjunction of such stimulus
dimensions are mapped to categories (Eling et al., 2008). In the second, informationintegration tasks, like many variants of the sinewave grating task of Ashby and colleagues
(1998), stimulus dimensions are mapped to categories in a way that cannot be explicitly
declared (e.g., Qadri et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2012). In the third, prototype-distortion
tasks, like the “A, not A” tasks of Posner & Keele (1968, 1970), stimulus dimensions are
mapped to categories based on the degree of similarity a prospective category member
shares with an unseen, prototypical category member. It is only the fourth major class of
categorization experiment, unstructured tasks, that maps items to categories arbitrarily
without regard to any stimulus dimension (Little et al., 2006).
In each of these designs, with few exceptions (the subset of informationintegration tasks that does not provide deterministic mappings between stimulus
properties and category membership will be discussed later in this chapter), any object
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with a given set of values on stimulus dimensions of interest is mapped, with absolute
certainty, to a specific category member or response. From these experiments, a
psychologist can evaluate the degree to which an individual or population evidenced
learning of these deterministic mappings of stimulus information to a category. Where
perfect utilization of the available information is not achieved, a mélange of exploratory
behaviors, novelty biases, and motoric considerations is often assumed to be to blame.
Any deterministic conception of categorization understates the degree to which
real relationships of interest between psychological inputs and observable outputs are
probabilistic (Kruschke & Johansen, 1999). Most charitably, deterministic categorization
tasks are a simplification of how a human or animal's categorization mechanisms work in
a single, specific context. For example, a child is either tall enough to ride a roller coaster,
or not tall enough to ride it. A single, deterministic dimension of height guides
categorization, and many other dimensions (e.g., clothing, hairstyle, freckle count) are
irrelevant. Decades of categorization research might inform whether such a
categorization is made by explicit, rule-based reasoning, or implicit, procedural learning,
or other orthodoxy. Both this depiction of real-life categorization and its experimental
models face limits to their validity and implementation. Such a perspective can only be
agnostic about how learners manage less deterministic cue information across contexts.
This is a serious shirking of duty, because demand for the ability to combine many
probabilistically noisy, conflicting cues is high. Many other categorizations about our
prospective coaster rider would require an evaluation of many dimensions that combine
far more fitfully. A school administrator would, one hopes, categorize the child into an
advanced, remedial, or on-level classroom based on an exceedingly complex mixture of
teacher impressions, classroom behavior, and scores from math, reading, and science

6
assessments. None of these cues are perfect, and the administrator can only hope to make
an informed probabilistic categorization about the student's true category membership.
In addition to these questions of the ecological validity of classic categorization
tasks, other domains of the social sciences also caution against simplifications of natural
category structures. To economists, there are insidious consequences to positing any
stable, deterministic relationship between an observable stimulus dimension and
category membership (Goodhart, 1984). To adopt a popular example: in academic
settings there is probably some relationship between a citation metric and the quality of
scholarship of an academic (i.e., a citation metric dimension can be used to categorize
academics as high quality or low quality scholars). However, as soon as the citation metric
becomes conventionally used as a deterministic predictor of scholarly quality, it ceases to
be one, because selection pressure for both academic and categorizer is to maximize on
that metric instead of maximizing on scholarly quality. In education policy a similar
caution is made regarding standardized achievement testing. Standardized tests may
deterministically predict scholastic success in normal teaching and testing conditions, but
not when school and student resources are subverted to maximize standardized test
scores (Sidorkin, 2016). Even in a relatively sterile social science like applied statistics,
the concept of overfitting codifies this idea that a well-validated relationship observed in
one context cannot be expected to be perfectly maintained in a new context (Babyak,
2004).
Psychologists use weather prediction tasks to model naturalistic, probabilistic
category structures by structuring the cue information available to an organism to be
probabilistically related to the value of the responses an organism can make (Gluck &
Bower, 1988). In this way, the uncertainty that permeates real life categorization contexts
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can be accounted for with exacting specificity, and titrated continuously. In most classic
weather prediction designs, each trial presents a participant with one to three imperfect
cues (often stylized as medical symptoms or tarot cards; Knowlton et al., 1994). The
participant is asked to choose which of two outcomes will be scored as correct in that trial.
Perfect performance is impossible in such a task, because even the greatest weight of cue
information a participant might receive will still underspecify the correct outcome.
Instead, the participant, like the school administrator, must work within their uncertainty
to make the best decision possible with the information that they have.

1.2 Probabilistic Decision-Making
The inferences made during these probabilistic categorizations are observable in
how individuals behave in naturally-occurring and experimentally-derived decisionmaking contexts. Humans and animals are often found to deviate from probability
theories’ recommendations given a set of probabilistic information, even when the task is
well-learned (Nickerson, 2004). To chronicle these deviations, cognitive psychologists
have cultivated an impressive bestiary of the many heuristics and biases that blight civil,
rational minds (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky &
Kahneman, 2014). For example, humans and pigeons neglect the prior probability of an
estimable occurrence and conversely assign undue decisional weight to any predictive
information, termed base-rate neglect (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Fantino et al., 2005; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982; Zentall & Clement, 2002). A positive test for a rare disease might be
understood as highly likely to reflect that the disease is present, even though the low prior
probability of the presence of the disease would instead suggest that a false alarm by the
test is much more likely. In a related example, this cue information is weighted so greatly
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that human evaluations of the probability space are not internally, logically consistent
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This conjunction fallacy is frequently illustrated via a short
vignette about a young woman with a history of social activism (sometimes called the
Linda problem). Human participants often evaluate that she is more likely to be a bank
teller who is active in feminist causes than that she is “merely” a bank teller. The young
woman’s activism is so strongly weighted by human observers that they propose the
logical impossibility that the conjunction of two states could be greater than one of the
states in isolation. Even at the earliest stages of probabilistic decision-making, humans
are not particularly successful at identifying where probabilistic information is and where
it is not. Humans routinely report that probabilistic relationships exist among sequences
or stimuli when the process that generated them was actually paradigmatically random
(Zhao et al., 2014).
There is a sense in which the size of this apparent gulf between recommendations
derived from Bayesian computation of probabilistic information and observed human
behavior has been exaggerated. The way in which such probabilistic decision-making
problems are typically framed, with percentile probabilities disseminated in words, is
ideal for Bayesian computation. This is highly different from how humans and animals
would sample probabilistic information from their natural environments (Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995). When experimenters present human participants with mechanically
identical probabilistic decision-making problems in a representational format more akin
to how evolution shaped minds to intuit probabilistic information, many of the irrational
biases can be substantially or entirely muted (Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer et al., 1991).
Accounts of human probabilistic decision-making behavior that seek to coax biases
from participants and those that forgive these biases as part of an entropy or effort
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reduction shorthand compete to provide superior accounts for probabilistic decisionmaking behavior (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Shah &
Oppenheimer, 2008). Similarly, conceptions of probability theory that draw from perfect
knowledge of the problem space compete with subjective, observed event frequency to
describe human interactions with probability theory best (Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer,
1994). Post-hoc labeling of characteristic responses of humans in highly specific, highly
verbal probabilistic decision-making contexts is common. In contrast, process-based or
mechanistic accounts of cognition and behavior are relatively uncommon (Gigerenzer,
1996). Stanovich and West (2000), and more popularly Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), understand the cognitive processes that produce these
characteristic responses as derived from two systems: one quick, effortless, intuitive, and
automatic and the other deliberate, effortful, and systematic. This clustering represents
an improvement on merely labeling biases, and is intellectually fruitful in that the
individual and correlational psychologies of how individuals may deploy these systems
can be explored (Cronbach, 1957). But even this approach reduces to a fairly trivial
labeling of inferred cognitive processing: “fast” or “slow”, with some inconsistently
correlated features (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018).
The restricted nature of these dual-process accounts distracts from the substantial
challenge that cognitive psychologists face in seeking to describe decision-making
processes molecularly, via their inputs, outputs, processes, neuronal substrates, and
proximate and ultimate causes. Kruschke and Johansen (1999) took up this challenge
with their Rapid Attention SHifts N Learning (RASHNL) model for probabilistic
cognition in which mathematical relationships among inputs from the environment, their
representation by an individual, and behavioral outputs can be specified exactly. More
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specifically, the RASHNL model built on previous connectionist models of human
cognition (e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988) to describe a probabilistic cognition that changes
continuously and dynamically across experience. More recently Trueblood, Busemeyer,
Pothos and their collaborators have advanced models of human probabilistic decisionmaking that trade connectionist principles for those borrowed from particle physics and,
in doing so, make explicit the characteristic indeterminacy of human brains and behaviors
(Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011; Trueblood et al., 2017). This
computationally intensive account, termed quantum cognition, has furnished formal
mathematical descriptions of how many of the characteristic responses humans make in
probabilistic situations may arise. These formal models, and others like them, provide
accounts of human probabilistic decision-making at unprecedented levels of detail.
Interestingly, the degree to which these models impact scientific discourse would seem to
be less a question of their accuracy (they provide a good fit to data, both real and
simulated) and more of the degree to which their core ideas can be disseminated to and
internalized by cognitive and applied psychologists who have already adopted the
fundamentally intuitive, but scientifically fraught dual-process typology.
Probabilistic decision-making theories thus appear to fall along a continuum. At
one extreme, researchers figuratively plant a tiny flag on the response that they will
consider rational and hundreds or thousands of additional flags on every other point
(each with its own unique identifier and publication). At the other extreme, researchers
seek to recreate, via pure mathematics, artificial neural networks, and/or principles of
particle physics, the computations undertaken by the brain-shaped black box that
transforms psychological inputs into behavioral outputs. An approach that appreciates
each of these perspectives may be uniquely valuable. Rigorously and mathematically
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defining experimentally derived inputs and predicted outputs is a requirement of
scientific progress, and a prerequisite of most statistical analyses of merit. That said, in
many contexts people and their cognitive processes really are clustered, such that labels
can properly represent psychological relationships (Bartlema et al., 2014). An
epistemological midpoint might borrow features from each extreme to make predictions
that are not only accurate, but are also transparently interpretable, accessible to other
scientists, and portable to new areas of cognitive inquiry.
Lee and colleagues have done much to advance such a perspective by using
principles of statistical model selection to identify which account, among competing
theories of involved cognitive processes, best accords with behavioral data of probabilistic
decision-making tasks. For example, Lee and Newell (2011) applied this strategy to a
classic decision-making problem in which the size of German cities is estimated. They
used behavioral and simulated data with competing formal models arranged using the
principles of the “Take-the-Best” heuristic and the influential weighted-additive rule. In
this way classic ideas about normative human decision-making behavior, complete with
heuristics and biases, are ported intact for principled, statistical evaluation alongside
competing accounts. Critically, these evaluations may inform what information was
utilized by participants and how participants’ cognitive competencies utilized this
information, alongside estimation of which rule or process provided the best fit. In the
case of Lee and Newell (2011), this approach facilitated novel inferences about participant
search strategies and stopping rules. In other cases, this approach has served to
discriminate among categorical and continuous differences in human cognitive processes
in a Multidimensional Scaling design (Bartlema et al., 2014) and demonstrate participant
sensitivity to probabilistically weighted evidence in a decision-making task (Lee, 2016).
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1.3 Strategy Analyses in Weather Prediction
A key feature of weather prediction tasks is that they can be completed at high rates
of success by any one of many different response strategies (Gluck et al., 2002; Meeter et
al., 2006). For example, in the set of relationships between cues and response
probabilities that is often used by weather prediction researchers, a simple Take-the-Beststyle heuristic is nearly optimal (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Todd & Gigerenzer, 1999). For
this reason, the more meaningful inference about participant performance in a weather
prediction task is not merely the proportion at which participants chose the correct
outcome, but rather the degree to which participants' responses are consistent with use
of one strategy or another. Because equivalent task performance by individual
participants does not require equivalent response mechanisms, response strategy use in
the task can vary wildly within the realm of roughly-equivalent rates of correct
responding.
These inferences are arrived at via strategy analyses techniques that compare many
theoretically-interesting models that make different, explicit predictions about
participant behavior in the task. Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) inaugurated the use
of such techniques in weather prediction designs. In their task, participants were asked
to predict whether ‘sun’ or ‘rain’ was a likelier outcome on the basis of a set of 1-3
arbitrary, probabilistic cues. To infer participant strategy use, they used a simple least
mean squared error measure in which a normalized count of the expected number of sun
responses predicted by each strategy minus the observed number of sun responses was
computed for each candidate model. Candidate models fell into three major designations.
Multi-Cue strategies assumed the optimal response (i.e., response that would be correct
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most often given the available cue information) to every cue combination, as if the
participant perfectly integrated the cue information they received. Single-cue strategies
assumed that responses were made based on the presence or absence of one cue. This type
of strategy assumed fundamentally rule-based responses (e.g., if cue1 is present, choose
response 1. if cue1 is not present, choose response 2). Finally, Singleton strategies
assumed that the participant made the optimal response any time only one cue was
presented, but failed to successfully integrate the information yielded by multiple cues.
The initial strategy analysis of Gluck and colleagues described most participants as best
fit by Singleton strategies, with few participants best fit by Single-Cue strategies and even
fewer best fit by optimal, Multi-Cue strategies.
Substantial elaborations on the strategy analysis of Gluck and colleagues were
made by Meeter, Myers, Shohamy, Hopkins, and Gluck (2006). Meeter and colleagues
translated the analysis to one that could be guided by standardized principles of model
selection and fit measures like Akaike's Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974), rather than
the opaquer inference yielded by the least mean squared error measure. Model
parameters representing participants' response rates to a predicted outcome were fixed
at a proportion less than one, modeling the assumption that even at mature responding
participants don't respond in perfect accordance with their strategy, and then simulated
response data were used to guide parameter assignment in the model. With their refined
modeling procedures, Meeter and colleagues tested a greater variety of plausible response
strategies. A class of Intermediate strategies was considered, including strategies that
integrate information across multiple cues so long as the cues provide converging
evidence. Perhaps most importantly, Meeter and colleagues included a Random strategy
that acted as a buffer against false alarms of strategy use when none was really present.
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These strategy analyses are part of a larger movement in the psychological sciences
towards categorical inferences about participant brains and behaviors. As previously
discussed, Lee (2016) expanded upon an earlier analysis of Hilbig and Moshagen (2014)
to make inferences about probable models for participant decision-making. In cognitive
neuroscience, mode networks like the default mode network (Greicius et al., 2003) or,
more recently, quasi-periodic patterns (Abbas et al., 2019), are similar conceits for
describing consistent patterns among isolable observations. In each of these analyses, as
in that of Meeter and colleagues, many correlated observations, be they consistent
patterns of activation and inhibition of independent neural networks or consistently
strategic responses made to specific sets of cue information, were synthesized using
modern model selection tools to offer novel insights into the phenomena of interest. In
each, the phenomena of interest were better understood by describing where they were
consistent with an unobservable, common cause. Indeed, this exact manner of inference
is precisely the one sought by the scientific method: which of the available candidate sets
of predictions (e.g., models, hypotheses, theories) best predicts observed data?
In weather prediction applications, these analyses reveal a characteristic pattern
of responses made by neurotypical adult humans. Responses are initially unstructured
and best fit by the Random strategy, as in the absence of any experience with the task any
relationship between cues and outcomes cannot be known (there is no logical relationship
between cues and outcomes to which a participant might reason). Random responses
typically give way to Single-Cue or Singleton responses based on single elements of the
available cue information. This trend mirrors inferences from absolute categorization
tasks in which rule-based responding is dominant over other types of responding such
that if an explicit rule is made available to participants, they will invariably use it (Church
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et al., 2018, but see Duncan et al., 2018 for demonstration of a preference for multicue
strategies over single-cue responding in an atypical weather prediction task). In many
weather prediction designs, the majority of participants do not use more complex
strategies than these rule-based, Take-the-Best strategies. These results are not
surprising, with analogs in the human decision-making literature (Lee & Newell, 2011;
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000) and deterministic categorization literature across species
(Smith et al., 2012). A minority of adult, neurotypical humans have sometimes used more
optimal strategies that include Multi-Cue integration of the cue information at late stages
of the task (Gluck et al., 2002; Kemény & Lukács, 2010; Meeter et al., 2006; Newell et al.,
2007).

1.4 Cognitive Neuroscience of Weather Prediction
Of greater theoretical significance are the inferences made about participant
populations other than neurotypical adults. Theories of language impairment, like the
procedural deficit hypothesis, posit that cognitive impairments to processing of
probabilistic information are the root cause of diagnoses like specific language
impairment or developmental dyslexia (Ullman & Pierpont, 2005; West et al., 2018).
Theorists have tested such theories by comparing weather prediction performances of
groups with and without these diagnoses. Finn and colleagues (2016) reported that 10year-old children made optimal responses in a weather prediction task at the same rate
as adults, but did not report the results of a strategy analysis comparing the two
populations. This result contrasts sharply with measures of declarative cognition of the
two groups, with adults demonstrably superior in working memory and long-term
memory measures. Gabay and colleagues (2015) reported that adults with developmental
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dyslexia demonstrated impaired learning on weather prediction tasks relative to matched
controls but were not significantly different from controls in their frequency of use of
Single-cue, Singleton, or Multicue strategies. Kemény and Lukács (2010) compared
language-impaired children (age M = 11.3 years, SD = 1.3), with age-matched typicallydeveloping children and adults. Language-impaired children performed at chance levels
across increasing experience in the task, and 11 out of 13 participating language-impaired
children were not well fit by any cue-based strategy. In contrast, both typically-developing
children and adults performed at above-chance levels within the first 50 trials and
adopted increasingly complex strategies over the course of testing.
Use of weather prediction tasks across participant populations have also been
important to the formulation and development of dual-process theories of learning and
memory that posit dissociable memory systems that vary in, among other things, the
degree to which the participant has conscious access to the inputs, outputs, and processes
of the system (Ashby et al., 1998). Knowlton et al. (1994) innovated this application of
weather prediction tasks in their exploration of the learning and memory abilities of eight
amnesic patients (two Korsakoff's diagnoses, one bilateral medial thalamic infarction
diagnosis, four with known or strongly evidenced hippocampal damage diagnoses, and
one idiopathic case). The amnesic participants performed as well as matched,
neurotypical control participants early in learning, but were markedly worse than controls
later in learning. The authors argued that because early weather prediction responding is
better accomplished without declarative memory (the probabilistic nature of the task
means that relying on discrete memory of what happened in a previous trial may be
misleading), amnesic participants' performance was not impaired. It was only later in
learning, after many opportunities to cultivate declarative knowledge about the
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probabilistic structure of the task, that control participants performed better than
participants with amnesia.
Knowlton et al. (1996) offered additional support to this argument. They presented
a weather prediction task to 7 participants with medial-temporal lobe amnesia and 5
participants with diencephalic amnesia, to 20 participants with Parkinson's disorder
(damage to striatal regions and others), and to age-matched control participants. As an
additional measure, they also asked participants verbally to report what they had learned
from the task. As in Knowlton et al. (1994), participants with amnesia were as effective at
the weather prediction task as controls during early task performance. However, these
participants could not answer basic multiple-choice questions about their testing
experience. In contrast, participants with Parkinson's disorder were not effective at the
core weather prediction task, but they were as effective as controls in reporting basic facts
about the testing session. This double-dissociation has been considered prime evidence
for the existence of two separable neurocognitive systems: a conscious, explicit,
declarative system underpinned by the hippocampus and mediotemporal regions (and
expressed via frontal regions) and an unconscious, implicit, procedural system
underpinned by the basal ganglia (and expressed via motor regions).
Neuronal encoding of the probabilisitic information associated with visual cues in
weather prediction tasks is thought to occur via the plasticity of synapses in the lateral
intraparietal cortex (Soltani & Wang, 2010; Yang & Shadlen, 2007). This region is
implicated in a variety of primate psychological processes, including memory for and
attention to visual stimuli (Sereno & Maunsell, 1998) and reinforcement learning in the
more probabilistic games of behavioral economics (Seo, Barraclough, & Lee, 2009).
Unlike the structured deviations from normative probability theory that humans
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frequently evidence in their behavior in the task, extracellular recordings of the synaptic
activity of the lateral intraparietal cortex have been found to very faithfully represent the
probability structure of a weather prediction task (Yang & Shadlen, 2007). The nature of
this synaptic activity can even explain certain systematic biases that are typically
exhibited in specific probabilistic decision-making contexts, like base rate neglect (Soltani
& Wang, 2010). Given this relatively precise encoding of probabilistic information at the
neuronal level, it is interesting that humans who complete weather prediction tasks are
reliably highly variable in both their task behavior and in their explicit reports about their
cognitive strategy use in the task.
These data are from a small number of neurons, from a small number of
nonhuman primates. As such, the generalizability of these neuronal readings is extremely
restricted. These reports perhaps suggest that not only is the probability structure of the
task identical across variably behaving animals, but also the encoding of this probability
structure is equivalent across variably behaving animals. In that case the variability must
arise somewhat further down the [neuro]cognitive stream, perhaps at one or both of the
regions identified by the separable systems account. The more rule-like processes
described by the separable systems account (and modeled by weather prediction strategy
analyses) take on a special role in culling the variability in psychology of probabilistic
inference that remains unexplained.

1.5 Interim Summary of Weather Prediction Research
Critically, the reviewed weather prediction studies (1) report behavioral
dissociations that reveal differential engagement of multiple memory systems over the
course of the task, and (2) demonstrate a marked link between the requirements of the
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task and clinical language and memory deficits. Such a link would have substantial
neurocognitive and clinical applications (Krishnan et al., 2016). However, other lines of
research make such a conclusion more fraught. Newell, Lagnado, and Shanks (2007)
presented multiple experiments that tested the predictions of dual-process theories in
weather prediction tasks. If classic weather prediction performance is the product of
implicit, procedural learning mechanisms, not explicit, declarative mechanisms, then the
inclusion of a concurrent task that taps into more declarative mechanisms should not
meaningfully disrupt weather prediction performance. Their Experiment 1 demonstrated
that inclusion of a verbal Stroop-like concurrent task disrupted learning of the weather
prediction task and changed the distribution of strategies used by participants. Dualprocess descriptions of weather prediction tasks also suggest that the task is completed
by procedural learning mechanisms because reward feedback is administered to
participant responses, and that more declarative mechanisms would be involved when
reward feedback is not administered in this way. Newell and colleagues' Experiment 2
tested groups of participants on weather prediction tasks either in which feedback was
administered after responses or in which participants passively viewed cues and their
associations to outcomes and reported that participant performance and strategy use did
not significantly differ between groups. Taken together, the invariability of classic
weather prediction tasks to changes in feedback contingencies and primary reinforcers
suggests no special role for uniquely procedural learning mechanisms in the task. In
contrast, declarative insight into what was learned in the task was strong throughout. No
manipulation in either experiment affected the accuracy of participants' verbal
estimations of the relationships between cues and outcomes.
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Classic conceptions of weather prediction are also critiqued on grounds of
philosophy of science (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009). Newell, Dunn, and Kalish (2011) argued
that the dual-systems conception of weather prediction performance is presented in such
a way that it cannot be readily falsified. That the performance of amnesic participants is
equivalent to that of control participants early in learning but not as good late in learning
is regarded as key evidence for both the mostly-procedural nature of weather prediction
tasks and the existence of dissociable memory systems (Knowlton et al., 1994). However,
precise behavioral indicators for when a participant might be using procedural versus
declarative mechanisms to complete the weather prediction task are conspicuously
absent. Instead, the structure of the argument from dual-systems theorists seems to be
one that fallaciously affirms the consequent: a theory that permits fluid switching
between procedural and declarative systems could accommodate the behavioral data
from amnesic and control participants, so the theory is supported. In such a case the fluid
switching offers its own inferential minefield, since the dual-systems are malleable
enough to accommodate nearly any behavioral data (Newell et al., 2011; Palmeri &
Flanery, 1999). Ashby and Maddox (2005) offered the more moderate criticism of classic
weather prediction designs in which what they call "explicit memorization" might be so
dominant a response strategy that much of the nuance of weather prediction tasks and
their analyses is ultimately wasted, and the centrality of weather prediction to dualprocess theory-crafting is overstated.
An alternative conception of weather prediction tasks and data (implied by the
earlier claim of affirming the consequent) is a family of theories and analyses that have
described weather prediction learning as happening gradually (Speekenbrink et al.,
2008). In these conceptions, any observed differences in weather prediction
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performances by different participant populations are described as the product of
differences in learning rates, not discrete, rule-like shifts. In a way that makes explicit the
distinction between processes of categorization and decision-making response behavior
outlined at the outset of this manuscript, Speekenbrink et al. (2008) utilized an analysis
strategy that divorces modeling of learning from modeling of responding (Cooksey, 1996).
This lens model yielded similar inferences to those of previous weather prediction
analyses; that is, that amnesic participants are very nearly as good as controls at the task,
they learn much about specifics of the task, and suffer an episodic memory deficit about
other aspects of the experiment. Their analyses differ in that they describe nuances of
participant performance via quantitative differences in learning rate between the groups
rather than the types of modular, systematic, qualitative differences described by dualprocess theorists.
Notably, at least in the case of weather prediction tasks, there is not disagreement
about whether the competing models fit to data (they do). Indeed, the opposed theorists
and their opposed models make largely the same predictions about each dataset (Meeter
et al., 2008). As in other realms of cognitive psychology in which complementary models
are wielded by theoretically opposed parties, relatively semantic explanatory virtues are
leveraged against one another in relatively subjective ways (Barsalou, 1992; Fidler, 2018;
Smith et al., 2016; Wills & Pothos, 2012). A strategy analysis perspective assumes discrete
shifts in behavior and describes them using language that implies dual influences of
procedural learning and cognitive control (i.e., participants [choose to] adopt one
[cognitive] strategy or another to complete the task). The lens model perspective assumes
gradual updating of learned associations between cues and outcomes, and gradual
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updating of the utilization of those learned associations. Each approach has its merits, but
a strategy analysis perspective boasts the following explanatory virtues (Fidler, 2018):
•

Analogy between the inferences of strategy analyses and those of other disciplines
are many, and were reviewed above (e.g., comparable models from the judgment
and decision-making psychological literatures, neuroscience mode networks, etc.).

•

The assumptions of strategy analyses are testable in a more robust manner strategies posit specific behaviors to specific sets of cues and test whether
responses conform to that specification at an arbitrarily frequent rate (e.g.,
thousands of times in Whitham & Washburn, 2020).

•

Ultimately a strategy analysis perspective is more intellectually fruitful. The
perspective yields a dissertation of theoretically interesting confirmatory and
exploratory hypotheses that can enrich our understanding of an important set of
cognitions, whether or not the strategy analysis perspective itself withstands the
tests of time.
[For reasons of aesthetic sensibility, the remainder of this manuscript will use

strategy use to connote response strategy use inferred by strategy analysis. I will imply
discrete shifts from one strategy to another, pursuant to published research that makes a
well-evidenced case that weather predictions tasks are better understood as mostly
declarative and rule-based in nature (Newell et al., 2007). Note that despite this choice,
these conclusions are analytically-derived inferences about discrete behaviors (not the
direct observation of mind the concise language may imply), and but one among many
interesting ways of exploring mind and behavior via weather prediction tasks.]
Divorced from any role as standard-bearer in dual-process theorizing, weather
prediction tasks are in many ways an ideal model of human and animal cognition and
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behavior in response to complex, probabilistic information. Unlike nearly every
experimental task of probabilistic decision-making research programs, the task need not
be a verbal problem in which each word is subject to etymological scrutiny (Hertwig &
Gigerenzer, 1999) and changing just a few words changes the nature of the problem
(Dulany & Hilton, 1991). Instead, probabilistic information can be disseminated across
experience in a way more akin to how natural frequencies are sampled by many species
(Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000). Indeed, how this probabilistic information is disseminated is
in many ways as flexible as the experimenter is: cues need not be restricted to one
modality or another, the number of cues can be as high or as low as needed (e.g., Soltani
& Wang, 2010; Yang & Shadlen, 2007), cue information can be weighted continuously,
and so forth. Common analyses of weather prediction, too, facilitate flexible matching of
statistics to experimental design. So long as a stable probability structure for the task can
be crafted, and theoretically interesting hypotheses for how individuals solve the task can
be specified, weather prediction tasks represent a well of potential for the experimental
study of probabilistic cognition in humans and animals.
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2

CORRELATIONAL, EXPERIMENTAL, AND COMPARATIVE
PSYCHOLOGY OF WEATHER PREDICTION

Previous research programs have provided rich descriptions of different individual
humans' brains and behaviors in a weather prediction task. What these studies cannot
answer is the degree to which the strategy use is a trait of an individual that is stable across
time, context, task manipulation, or other intraindividual factors. In the language of
Cronbach (1957), much research has been done on the correlational psychology of
weather prediction tasks and relatively little on their experimental psychology (Conway
& Kovacs, 2013). Indeed, many designs are fundamentally correlational - how do different
people with different neuronal structures, or different ages, or different diagnoses, solve
the weather prediction task (see Table 2.1) - with titles that follow a discrete Mad Lib
format: "How does [population] solve the weather prediction task" (Gluck et al., 2002;
Meeter, et al., 2008; Whitham & Washburn, 2020).
The strategy analysis perspective often adopted by weather prediction researchers
offers promise for an experimental psychology component in the form of the longitudinal
tracking of participant strategy use. Whereas comparisons of the strategy-use trajectories
of different participants, from different participant populations, is fundamentally a
correlational psychology pursuit, that a trajectory of individual inferences - that is, a set
of inferences made about cognition as it is manifest across experience - was charted in the
first place is a nontrivial step toward understanding the intraindividual factors that guide
probabilistic categorization.
Comparative psychology has much to offer to the study of outstanding questions
about probabilistic cognition. Many of the characteristic behaviors that humans evidence
in probabilistic decision-making tasks are present in animal species as well (Blanchard et
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al., 2014; Klein et al., 2013; Mazur & Kahlbaugh, 2012; Watzek et al., 2018). Most species
have not been demonstrated to monitor their own uncertainty, and are likely to engage
processes of categorization and decision-making without actually evaluating the amount
of uncertainty in their environment. That these species solve probabilistic categorization
and decision-making tasks is tautology – they make decisions in their native
environments, and their native environments are rife with probabilistic cues. But despite
some animals’ demonstration of flexible, strategic leveraging of rule-based responses in
other categorization tasks, they have rarely been previously studied in such terms (Smith
et al., 2012). Furthermore, comparative psychology can offer a greater wealth of data from
individuals within and across task manipulations, great potential for correlation of
strategic behavior to other cognitive measures, and a window into the evolutionary
trajectory of this fundamental cognitive competency.
Whitham and Washburn (2020) explored what patterns of responses nonhuman
primates would spontaneously use to solve a classic weather prediction task. These
monkeys were not constrained to ~200 trials of the task in an hour or less, like most
weather prediction designs with humans, and therefore had their strategy use assessed at
unprecedented levels of experience in the task. The authors adapted the weather
prediction task of Gluck and colleagues (2002) for use with a computerized test system
for nonhuman primates (the Language Research Center - Computerized Test System;
Evans et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 1990). Cue information was disseminated via clipart
images on a nearby computer screen, instead of via manipulable tarot card cues. Monkeys
used a joystick apparatus to make a response towards one of two additional clipart images
that acted as the binary response options ‘Sunny’ and ‘Rainy’. The authors maintained all
probability and relative frequency information from Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers, with
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the key difference that the overall exposure to the task was far greater (with many
monkeys completing thousands of trials).
These monkeys followed a distinctly different trajectory of strategy use in
probabilistic categorization tasks than do typical adult human participant populations
(Whitham & Washburn, 2020). Whereas humans often transition smoothly from using
responses that are not strategic to responses that depend on only a single item of cue
information to (in some cases) responses that flexibly integrate multiple sources of cue
information, many monkeys used no cue information at all in favor of other vaguely
strategic responding (e.g., use of only one response per session). Many other monkeys
were eventually best fit by a Single-Cue strategy that depended on the presence or absence
of the same, single, highly-predictive cue, with some monkeys shifting to this strategy only
after many hundreds of trials. No monkeys were consistently best fit by Singleton
strategies (that respond optimally to any trial that has only one cue onscreen) or to
strategies requiring integration of probabilistic information yielded by multiple cues.
Most divergent from studies with healthy human adults, the monkeys adopted a strategy
very quickly and adhered to it with incredible fidelity. No monkey smoothly transitioned
from less sophisticated strategy use to more sophisticated strategy use (beyond the initial
transition away from random responding). In this sense the monkeys’ strategy use was
more like that of language-impaired children than typically-developing adults (although
whether this apparent similarity is due to task motivation, cognitive similarities, both, or
neither is an outstanding question; Kemény & Lukács, 2010),
Whitham and Washburn (2020) were the first to apply the strategy analyses of
Meeter et al. (2006) to weather prediction task performance of animals. However, using
relative probabilities of participant responses to specifically structured stimuli to yield
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unique information about how participants learn and utilize the information with which
they are presented is a classic technique in cognitive psychology. Indeed, weather
prediction designs and analyses have much in common with identification and
[deterministic] categorization designs that have played a crucial role in cognitive
psychology's understanding of object identification and categorization processes (with
weather prediction tasks taxonomized as "probabilistic categorization" here and
elsewhere). These literatures even share the useful metaphor of stimulus representations
and response probabilities as distributed in geometric (typically 2-dimensional,
Euclidean) space (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005). In each case, structure in the
experimentally observed behaviors of an individual is used to reveal how an individual
psychologically clustered the information they learned from the presented stimuli.
For example, multidimensional scaling has proven an exceptionally powerful tool
for identifying these clusters and how they are distributed in different kinds of stimuli
and by different individuals or groups. Shepard (1957, 1958) inaugurated the study of how
minds represent physically different stimuli as conceptually so by innovating
multidimensional scaling analyses for the metaphorical mapping of psychology to
geometric space. This core conceit, initially relatively exploratory in scope, is among the
most influential confluences of mathematics and psychology (Jaworska & ChupetlovskaAnastasova, 2009). Multidimensional scaling underpins many influential models of
human [deterministic] categorization (Nosofsky, 1992; Smith & Minda, 1998), and has
been extended to considerations of decision-making utility and evolutionary optimality
(Herbranson et al., 1999). In this way it can inform our understanding of the cognitive
evolution of human and animal minds by quantifying the degree of similarity with which
psychologically relevant clusters are distributed across taxa (Smith et al., 2012).
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Furthermore, the challenge faced by Whitham and Washburn (2020) of using
nonverbal, behavioral measures to describe how animals complete tasks is endemic to
comparative psychology and vital to its progress as a discipline. Rumbaugh (1971)
described the ways in which the distribution of cognitive-behavioral data from disparate
primate taxa were poorly accounted for by associative principles alone, and how
percentage differences in percent correct in a simple learning task were better understood
as the product of qualitatively different cognitive processes rather than of differences in
parameters of associative value like learning rate. Cook, Brown, and Riley (1985)
demonstrated differential leveraging of retrospective and prospective memory processes
by rats as they completed radial arm mazes with interspersed interruptions. More
generally, many of the scholars in comparative psychology’s long tradition of mazerunning designs have registered dissatisfaction with the limitations of using response
latency or maze errors alone to describe the complex cognition evidenced by an animal in
a maze, and sought alternative measures to offer a more complete account of how the
animal completed the task (Fragaszy et al., 2003; Washburn, 1992). In these examples
and many others, a premium is placed on accounts that appreciate psychology as a science
of process-based accounts for psychological data and not ‘merely’ the rate at which
animals can earn rewards in different kinds of tasks (Dutilh et al., 2019).
This dissertation will borrow liberally from these traditions in order to describe
more fully the conditions in which rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys adopt more
optimal use of the provided probabilistic cues. This will allow us to better understand the
processes that underpin a complex, ecologically-valid cognitive-behavioral task. These
species have been previously used as an appropriate model for many high-level cognitivebehavioral phenomena of interest, including analogical reasoning (Basile et al., 2015;
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Flemming et al., 2011), self-control (Beran et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2014), artificial
grammar abstraction (Wilson et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2015), and many others. Each of
these species contributes uniquely to this dissertation beyond their ability to complete
many thousands of trials. Both species are hardy, long-lived, omnivorous primates with
relatively large brains and highly complex social dynamics, with each of these features
among the strongest predictors of sophisticated cognition in animals (Deaner et al., 2007;
Dunbar & Schultz, 2007; Fragaszy et al., 2004; Lindburg, 1971). Comparison of Old World
(i.e., macaque) and New World (i.e., capuchin) monkey species that diverged some 40
million years ago may enrich our understanding of the evolution of the cognitive
competencies that facilitate probabilistic cognition. Critically, the two species seem to
vary in the degree to which they mobilize what would be called the more explicit,
declarative aspects of cognition in dual-process typology. Hampton, Engelberg, and
Brady (2020) reviewed a wealth of cognitive-behavioral data from rhesus macaques to
conclude that these animals indeed have explicit dimensions to their cognition that are
inconsistently engaged by experimental tasks, especially a restricted subset of memory,
selective attention, and metacognition paradigms. Capuchin monkeys are often found to
engage less successfully with this same set of memory, selective attention, and
metacognition tasks (Basile et al., 2009; Beran et al., 2014; Beran et al., 2015; Beran &
Smith, 2011). Newell, Lagnado, and Shanks (2007, reviewed above) convincingly
demonstrated that, in humans, weather prediction tasks are principally rule-based and
explicit. The apparent distinction between explicit cognition utilization of the two species,
along with the greater trial experience the monkeys will receive, thus affords a unique
description of the trajectory of rule-based responding as it evolves across low versus high
levels of task experience for species with relatively lower and relatively higher degrees of
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explicit cognition. These pre-existing group differences set up interesting comparisons
which are complementary to more focal hypotheses about the underpinnings of
probabilistic cognition.
By better understanding the network of individual predictors and task conditions
associated with different patterns of performance on the weather prediction task, we may
better understand the processes involved in the real-life situation for which the weather
prediction task is a sincere model. By understanding predictors of more optimal
responding specifically, we may more fully understand how to elicit more sophisticated
response patterns to the situations modeled by weather prediction tasks. Finally, the
inferences about probabilistic categorization gleaned by the exceedingly large trial counts
and statistical precision afforded by comparative psychology may be applied to renewed
explorations of how optimal responding may be encouraged in humans. In particular, it
is unclear what has limited the ability of humans and other animals to make decisions
that make use of more of the available cue evidence in previous weather prediction tasks.
One possibility is that the 30 to 60 minute experimental sessions that human participants
complete in typical weather prediction designs yields too few exposures to the embedded
probabilistic relationships of the task, and that this restricts the range and complexity of
strategy use. Although studies that offer humans more comprehensive experience with
the task have not been published, the comparative data of Whitham and Washburn
(2020) demonstrated very little continued elaboration of strategy use after initial strategy
adoption. For monkeys, at least, the more fundamental determinant of behavior must be
more cognitive, perceptual, motivational, or procedural. A comprehensive evaluation of
the evidence for each of these possibilities may guide both the basic science of
probabilistic cognition and application of this science wherever inferences are made.
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2.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed as a set of conceptual replications of Whitham and
Washburn (2020) to explore the extent to which strategy use by an animal was consistent
across mechanically identical weather prediction tasks. Rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella) completed five iterations of a
computerized adaptation of the cognitive-behavioral weather prediction task of Gluck,
Shohamy, and Myers (2002), with each iteration using a different set of onscreen stimuli
for each cue and response. If cognitive strategy use during probabilistic categorization
was indeed a reliable trait of an individual, strategy analysis should reveal a similar set of
strategies for the same animal across each iteration of the task. If responses were
qualitatively changed by the practice that five iterations of the design might afford,
disproportionately guided by early experience in the task, or demonstrably unstructured
across the animals' experience with the task, strategy analysis should reveal no such
consistency.

H0: The null hypothesis for each of the succeeding experiments suggests that strategy
use is the product of random sampling from a population-level distribution of strategies
and their frequencies, and that the strategy adopted in each new task by each monkey
is a random draw from that distribution.

Hypothesis I: Strategy use during probabilistic categorization is a stable trait of an
individual animal, and the same strategies used by an animal in one weather prediction
task will be those used in another task.
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2.2 Experiment 2
In contrast, Experiment 2 was a set of directly theory-motivated attempts to upset
any consistent strategy use observed in Experiment 1 and to encourage use of multicue
strategies. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c assessed the degree to which strategy use by the
animals was dictated by parameters of rote associative evaluation like reward rate.
Optimal foraging theory, monkeys' behavior in other cognitive-behavioral computer
games, and motivational/associative theory converge to predict that when additional
cognitive or motoric effort is required to acquire primary reinforcement, organisms are
likely to adjust their behavior to meet that challenge (in a way consistent with their species
and individual powers; Blanchard & Hayden, 2015; Kangas et al., 2016; Ross &
Winterhalder, 2015; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992). In probabilistic decision-making
designs with humans, the nature of strategy use has been demonstrated to change with
endogenous motivation (Giner-Sorolila & Chaiken, 1997). As the reward rate for chance
performance is made less and less lucrative, any animals that had not previously
demonstrated above-chance performance on the weather prediction task should adopt a
strategy that will yield a success rate that maintains the animal at the individual reward
rate it expects of its tasks. It is possible that some animals may use more complex,
multicue strategies to maximize a decremented reward rate, but this is unlikely in weather
prediction designs in which single-cue and multicue strategies are nearly equivalently
successful.

Hypothesis II: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an
individual's preferred strategy, and titration of overall reward rate in the task will alter
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strategy use accordingly. Specifically, the animals that used Random or Side-Bias
strategies in Experiment 1 will use cue information to guide responding in Experiments
2a, 2b, and 2c.

Experiments 2d and 2e similarly probed the degree to which another relationship
of fundamentally associative value – that of the reward frequency of responses in the
presence of the different cues – guided strategy use. Nearly every previous weather
prediction design has used the table of cue validities and probabilities introduced by
Experiment 2 of Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) (e.g., Meeter et al., 2006; Newell et
al., 2007; Shohamy et al., 2008). Although this makes the differential psychology of
weather prediction easier (see Table 2.1) by facilitating comparisons across groups on the
same task, other probability tables may be crafted that might yield different strategy use
trajectories. As the amount of information yielded by each cue becomes more similar,
multicue strategies (especially those that optimize according cue information) may
become relatively more attractive whereas single-cue strategies become relatively less so.
As above, we would expect the animals' behavior in the task to change accordingly.

Hypothesis III: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an
individual's preferred strategy, and a set of more egalitarian cue probabilities will beget
greater multicue responding in the animals that readily use strategies. Animals that do
not readily use strategies will revert to Random or Side-biased strategies.
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2.3 Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, each manipulation of psychological significance was titrated
exactly by the experimenter to test theory-motivated hypotheses. In contrast, the
manipulations included in Experiment 3 were exploratory and designed to probe
theoretically interesting questions about the nature of probabilistic categorization in
animals. Note that throughout Experiment 3, manipulation checks of whether monkeys
perceived the stimuli in the intended manner were not readily available.
Monkeys process complex visual stimuli locally, via their more minute features,
rather than globally via the whole stimulus array in its entirety (Hopkins & Washburn,
2002; Spinozzi et al., 2003). In the task of Whitham and Washburn (2020), the cue
information was distributed across the computer screen such that animals might
reasonably have only processed one cue or region of the screen each trial. To test whether
animals might more optimally integrate cue information when local processing of this
kind is discouraged, Experiment 3a explored strategy use by monkeys to a weather
prediction task in which the cue information was presented in such a way that this local
processing bias could be minimized. In Experiment 3a, simple cue images appeared in
close spatial proximity. Another way to manipulate local processing biases of the monkeys
may be to present the cue information in a context in which monkeys have been
demonstrated to process information more globally, like illusory motion or faces (Leopold
& Rhodes, 2010; Taubert et al., 2017). Experiment 3b oriented the probabilistic cue
information as a face that the animals might be more likely to process holistically.
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Hypothesis IV: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and design
considerations that have been demonstrated to engender multicue perception will
engender multicue strategy use.

Similarly, many cognitive processes are seemingly deployed differently in social
contexts than they are in nonsocial contexts (Jack et al., 2013). Moreover, weather
prediction tasks can be understood to mimic problems presented in many social decisionmaking situations. For example, a socially subordinate monkey assessing whether or not
an attempt to exploit food resources would be punished by dominant conspecifics would
do well to assess probabilistic information yielded by the number and identities of nearby
conspecifics, the direction of conspecifics' gazes, the severity of recent aggression events,
and so forth. Although a computerized task struggles to model such a context exactly, an
exploration of whether strategy use is sharper (or duller) when cues resemble highly
salient, socially interesting information is a natural extension of the present research.
Experiments 3c and 3d provided animals with weather prediction tasks in which the
predictive cues were photographs of conspecific faces and bodies, respectively.

Hypothesis V: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and cues that are
qualitatively different than those of other experiments (socially interesting rather than
asocial; discrete rather than abstract; inherently salient rather than sterilely
controlled) should engender qualitatively different strategy use.
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2.4 Experiment 4
Because many monkeys did not use cue information in Experiments 1, 2, or 3, the
reward rate manipulations of Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c were extended even further. The
hypotheses and rationale for this manipulation were unchanged from Experiment 2.
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Table 2.1 Correlational Psychology of Weather Prediction

Diagnosis

Citation

Clinical N

Performance deficit?

Alzheimer's
disorder

Eldridge, Masterman, &
Knowlton, 2002

8

No performance deficit, declarative knowledge of task
environment impaired.

Anterograde
amnesia

Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck,
1994

8

Performance deficit appears only late in testing, declarative
knowledge of task environment impaired.

Knowlton, Squire, & Mangels,
1996

12

Performance deficit appears only late in testing, declarative
knowledge of task environment impaired.

Speekenbrink, Channon, &
Shanks, 2008

9

No performance deficit, declarative knowledge of task
environment intact.

Meeter et al., 2006

7

Deficit to ability to utilize and elaborate response strategy.

Developmental
dyslexia

Gabay, Vakil, Schiff, & Holt,
2015

15

Performance deficits throughout testing on weather prediction
tasks both with and without trial-by-trial feedback.

Parkinson's
disorder

Knowlton, Squire, & Mangels,
1996

20

Performance deficits throughout testing, declarative knowledge
of task environment intact.

Moody, Bookheimer, Vanek,
& Knowlton, 2004

8

No performance deficit, declarative knowledge of task
environment intact.

Kemény & Lukács, 2010

16

Performance deficits throughout testing.

Specific
language
impairment
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3

METHODS

3.1 Participants
Seven rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and twenty capuchin monkeys (Cebus
[Sapajus] apella) housed at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University
took part in the series of experiments. Due to time and testing constraints, and differences
in monkeys’ enthusiasm for the task, every animal did not complete every experiment
(specific participant numbers will be reported in the Results chapter). Each animal had
an extensive history participating in computerized cognitive-behavioral research on tasks
that probed the cognitive and comparative psychology of phenomena as diverse as
perception of visual illusions (e.g., Parrish et al., 2015), self control (e.g., Evans et al.,
2014), metacognition (e.g., Smith et al., 2010), and behavioral economics (Parrish et al.,
2014). Many of these animals (~41%) also participated in the weather prediction task of
Whitham and Washburn (2020).
Capuchin monkeys were housed in small social groups of 2 to 9 animals in large
indoor enclosures with attached outdoor enclosures. Each morning, animals were given
the opportunity to voluntarily separate from their main enclosure and social group into a
smaller, testing enclosure. Any animal that voluntarily separated was given access to a
testing apparatus for four to six hours before being returned to their main enclosure and
social group. Rhesus macaques were single-housed in indoor enclosures with daily access
to an outdoor play area. Testing apparatus was available to each animal 23-24 hours per
day, six days per week. Animals with a socially-compatible conspecific often spent one
hour each day in their outside play area with that conspecific and without access to testing
apparatus.
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Animals were not food- or water-deprived at any time for testing purposes, and
elected to participate in the task or pursue other activities at their individual discretion.
All animals were maintained on a nutritionally-complete diet of nuts, fruits, vegetables,
and commercial primate food independently of their participation in any research
activities. All research protocols were approved by an Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee.

3.2 Apparatus and General Procedure
Animals were tested using an adapted version of the Language Research Center Computerized Test System (Evans et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 1990). Computergenerated stimuli were presented to the animal on a computer monitor positioned just
outside the animal's testing enclosure. Animals responded to these stimuli using a joystick
mounted inside their testing enclosure (capuchin monkeys) or within an arm's reach
outside of their enclosure (rhesus macaques). Each correct joystick response to onscreen
stimuli was rewarded with a 45 mg banana-flavored primate pellet and an ascending tone
played from a speaker adjacent to the computer monitor. Each incorrect response caused
a buzzing tone to be played from the same speaker, and no food reward to be dispensed.
For each new manipulation in each experiment, new images for cues and outcomes were
used and new spatial locations for cues and outcomes were assigned.
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3.3 Experimental Procedures
3.3.1 Experiment 1 Procedures
Monkeys completed a computerized version of the classic weather prediction task
of Gluck and colleagues (2002). On each trial, one, two, or three of four total cues
simultaneously appeared onscreen as computer-generated visual images. The animal
responded to these cues via a joystick deflection to one of two responses (R or S), also
denoted onscreen as computer-generated images (Figure 3.1).
Critically, the cues combined to offer incomplete, probabilistic evidence about
which of the two responses would be rewarded (see Table 3.1). These probabilities were
structured such that each cue appeared equally often in each 200 trial block and each
response was rewarded equally often. Cues 1, 2, 3, and 4 were associated with Response
R being rewarded at validities .2, .4, .6, and .8, respectively.
A 1-second intertrial interval elapsed after correct responses, and a 4-second
intertrial interval elapsed after incorrect responses. After each 1,000 completed trials, the
images associated with cues and outcomes were replaced with new images, and the spatial
orientations of the cues were reassigned (i.e., if the leftmost cue was cue 3 for the first
1,000 trials, it might cease to be so in subsequent experiments). Experiment 1 concluded
after 5,000 trials and five sets of images for cues and outcomes.

3.3.2 Experiment 2 Procedures
3.3.2.1 Experiment 2abc Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 for each of three
new sets of response contingencies. In Experiment 2a, 4 seconds elapsed after correct
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responses and 6 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. In Experiment 2b, 5 seconds
elapsed after correct responses and 8 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. In
Experiment 2c, 6 seconds elapsed after correct responses and 10 seconds elapsed after
incorrect responses. These manipulations changed the overall reward rate of the task, in
attempts to change the strategy use of the animals accordingly.

3.3.2.2 Experiment 2d Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 with a
modified probability table (Table 3.2). Cues 1, 2, 3, and 4 were associated with Response
R at validities .28, .41, .59, and .72, respectively. This manipulation changed the relative
information yielded by each cue, in an attempt to change the strategy use of the animals
accordingly.

3.3.2.3 Experiment 2e Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 with a
modified probability table (Table 3.3). Cues 1, 2, 3, and 4 were associated with Response
R at validities .33, .45, .55, and .67, respectively.

3.3.3 Experiment 3 Procedures
3.3.3.1 Experiment 3a Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but with
cues oriented such that they are spatially contiguous (Figure 3.2).
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3.3.3.2 Experiment 3b Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but with
cues that were oriented as features on the face of a computerized version of a popular
vegetable face man toy (Figure 3.3). Other weather prediction designs have used these
toys as stimuli with human participants (e.g., Meeter et al., 2006; Shohamy et al., 2008).

3.3.3.3 Experiment 3c Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but public
domain photographs of conspecific faces as cues. The animals depicted in the
photographs were not familiar to any of the tested animals.

3.3.3.4 Experiment 3d Procedures.
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but with
public domain photographs of conspecific bodies as cues. The animals depicted in the
photographs were not familiar to any of the tested animals.

3.3.4 Experiment 4 Procedures
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 for each
of four new sets of response contingencies. In Experiment 4a, 2 seconds elapsed after
correct responses and 6 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. In Experiment 4b, 3
seconds elapsed after correct responses and 8 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses.
In Experiment 4c, 4 seconds elapsed after correct responses and 10 seconds elapsed after
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incorrect responses. In Experiment 4d, 4 seconds elapsed after correct responses and 14
seconds elapsed after incorrect responses.

3.3.5 Methods Summary
The proposed sequence of experiments promised greater depth of experimental
exploration (via the wealth of data comparative psychology can offer) and greater breadth
of experimental manipulation (via the diversity of intraindividual designs that
experimental psychology can offer) than any previous experimentation with the uniquely
ecologically valid weather prediction task (see Table 3.4). How individuals independently
come to conclude that available evidence is relatively strong or weak and how it may be
associated with the true state of the universe is a fundamental, pressing issue for cognitive
psychology.
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Table 3.1 Probability Structure of Experiment 1

Cue
Pattern

Cue 1
Present?

Cue 2
Present?

Cue 3
Present?

Cue 4
Present?

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

Times Response Times Response
R Rewarded
S Rewarded
17
7
24
2
10
3
17
2
3
2
5
2
4
2

2
2
2
7
2
3
2
17
3
10
4
24
5
17

Pattern
appearances per
200 trials
19
9
26
9
12
6
19
19
6
12
9
26
9
19
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Table 3.2 Probability Structure of Experiment 2d

Times Response Times Response
R Rewarded
S Rewarded

Pattern
appearances per
200 trials

Cue
Pattern

Cue 1
Present?

Cue 2
Present?

Cue 3
Present?

Cue 4
Present?

A

0

0

0

1

16

3

19

B

0

0

1

0

6

3

9

C

0

0

1

1

21

5

26

D

0

1

0

0

3

6

9

E

0

1

0

1

7

5

12

F

0

1

1

0

3

3

6

G

0

1

1

1

16

3

19

H

1

0

0

0

3

16

19

I

1

0

0

1

3

3

6

J

1

0

1

0

5

7

12

K

1

0

1

1

5

4

9

L

1

1

0

0

5

21

26

M

1

1

0

1

4

5

9

N

1

1

1

0

3

16

19
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Table 3.3 Probability Structure of Experiment 2e

Cue
Pattern

Cue 1
Present?

Cue 2
Present?

Cue 3
Present?

Cue 4
Present?

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

Times Response Times Response
R Rewarded
S Rewarded
14
5
19
4
8
3
14
5
3
4
5
7
4
5

5
4
7
5
4
3
5
14
3
8
4
19
5
14

Pattern
appearances per
200 trials
19
9
26
9
12
6
19
19
6
12
9
26
9
19
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Table 3.4 Experimental Psychology of Weather Prediction

Confirmatory /
Exploratory
Confirmatory

Exploratory

Experiment

Manipulation

Hypothesis

Experiment 1abcde

Within-experiment
replication, practice
with task

Hypothesis I: Strategy use during probabilistic categorization is a trait of
an individual animal, and the same strategies used by an animal in one
weather prediction task will be those used in another task.

Experiment 2abc,
4abcd

Reward rate for
chance responding
decremented

Hypothesis II: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors
other than an individual's preferred strategy, and titration of overall
reward rate in the task will titrate strategy use accordingly. Specifically,
the animals that use Random or Side-Bias strategies in Experiment 1 will
use cue information to guide responding in Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c.

Experiment 2de

Cue validities
decremented

Hypothesis III: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors
other than an individual's preferred strategy, and a set of task
probabilities that demands multicue responding to maintain high reward
rates will beget such responding in the animals that readily use strategies.
Animals that do not readily use strategies will revert to Random or Sidebiased strategies.

Experiment 3a

Cues spatially
contiguous

Experiment 3b

Cues as face

Hypothesis IV: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and
design considerations that have been demonstrated to engender multicue
perception will engender multicue strategy use.

Experiment 3cd

Socially-interesting
cues

Hypothesis V: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and cues
that are qualitatively different than those of other experiments (sociallyinteresting rather than asocial; discrete rather than abstract; inherently
salient rather than sterilely controlled) should engender qualitatively
different strategy use.

48

Figure 3.1 Demonstration of task screen for Experiments 1, 2, and 4. Cues, responses, and joystick-controlled cursor
are labeled for clarity. All four cues are presented together only for demonstration purposes, as this pattern will not
appear in any experiment.
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Figure 3.2 Demonstration of task screen for Experiment 3a
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Figure 3.3 Demonstration of task screen for Experiment 3b
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4

RESULTS

4.1 Analysis Plan
Whitham and Washburn's (2020) elaboration of the strategy-analysis technique of
Meeter and colleagues (2006) was used to analyze data from each experiment. In such an
analysis, each of an arbitrary number of possible response strategies that an animal might
employ to complete the task is expressed formally as a model for the observed data, then
model selection procedures are used to identify which of the strategies/models best
accounts for the data. Any hypothetical strategy that can predict consistent responses to
each cue pattern can be specified and tested. I tested the wide range of easily verbalizable
strategies that was previously probed by Whitham and Washburn (2020).
Table 4.1 describes many of the strategies that humans and monkeys might use to
solve the task. These strategies vary greatly in their cognitive and computational
complexity. Some strategies predicted use of no cue information at all (e.g., Random, S or
R Biases). Other strategies predicted responses on the basis of only a single cue (e.g.,
Singleton, Single-cue). Still other strategies predicted that the probabilistic information
yielded by multiple cues would be synthesized suboptimally (e.g., Singleton-Prototype,
Two v One, All but Two Strong Cards). Finally, a Perfect response strategy predicted that
the optimal response will be made to each of the cue patterns. Because we expected that
monkeys might adopt side biases when the strategy that they adopted does not offer a
specific prediction, rather than choosing among the responses randomly, side-biased
variants of many of the strategies were included. For example, a Singleton strategy
predicted that the animal would make optimal responses any time a single cue was
onscreen, and choose at chance otherwise; the side biased variants instead predicted that
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the animal would make optimal responses any time a single cue is onscreen and make
side-biased R or S responses otherwise.
The specific predictions made by each strategy, to each cue pattern, are listed in
Table 4.2. Even an individual that adopted a strategy exactly as it is described in Table
4.2, however, would be very unlikely to make every predicted response to each iteration
of the various cue patterns. Perseverative or motoric errors, probability matching
behaviors, and exploration of the problem space are but a few of the reasons why an
individual might have deviated from the predicted response (Shanks et al., 2002;
Speekenbrink et al., 2008). To account for this, the rate at which forecasted responses
were made to cue patterns was instead described via an adherence rate parameter. Meeter
and colleagues (2006), who innovated this approach with human participants, fixed the
adherence rate parameter at .95. This indicates that individuals made responses
consistent with the strategy they were understood to have adopted 95% of the time.
Despite the apparent incongruity between inadherent monkeys and very high predicted
adherence, the .95 adherence rate remained a sensible choice. Meeter and colleagues
reported simulation data that suggested that even when simulated participants adhered
to a strategy on fewer than 95% of trials, a .95 adherence rate did a superior job of
correctly identifying the strategy that was used to simulate the data. Lee (2016) reported
that in similar strategy analyses of human behavioral data, adherence is reliably very high.
Although the monkeys’ decremented attention and propensity for perseverative errors
with the joystick, to name two likely species differences, may have made them unlikely to
adhere to a strategy so closely as do humans, assuming high adherence is the
recommendation from both simulation and comparative cognition perspectives.
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Each 40 trials completed by an animal was analyzed as a separate block. The fit of
a strategy to each of these 40 trials blocks was estimated in the following manner. First,
the binomial likelihood of seeing x S responses in n exposures to a cue pattern when the
probability of an S response is .95, .05, or .5 (see Table 4.2) was computed. Such a
likelihood was computed for each cue pattern that an animal was exposed to in those 40
trials (typically all cue patterns, for 14 likelihoods). Next, the product of these likelihoods
was used to describe the extent to which that strategy was a good fit to the 40 trials. These
two steps were repeated for each of the 25 probable strategies that were specified. The
greatest value among these products (corresponding to the lowest Akaike's Information
Criteria value; Akaike, 1974) was taken as the best fitting strategy for that set of trials.
These steps were repeated for each block of 40 trials in an experiment, for every other
experiment, and for every monkey. After the likeliest strategies were identified, inferences
about strategy use trends were then assessed via analyses of strategy frequencies within
and across experiments and animals, estimation of stability of strategy from block to
block, visualization of strategy adoption/maintenance, and other analyses.
The optimal number of trials used to identify strategy use via this analysis, with
these species, is unclear. Use of many trials would facilitate stronger fits of strategies to
data when strategy use is consistent, because the influence of rare strategy inadherence
on strategy fit is diluted. However, taking many trials as model input when strategy use is
more inconsistent risks the model attempting to label use of multiple strategies as a single
strategy. On the other end of the continuum, use of too few trials prevents the analysis
from making accurate identifications in the first place. The sample size of 40 trials that
this analysis plan takes as model input is informed by simulated data analyses reported
by Meeter and colleagues (2006) and Whitham and Washburn (2020). This represents a
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relative “Goldilocks number” at which the model input is neither too large (and risks
misidentifying heterogeneous use of multiple strategies as a single strategy) nor too small
(thwarting accurate strategy identification). Figure 4.1 shows the ability of the analysis
perfectly or near-perfectly to recover the strategy used to simulate the data when high
adherence is assumed. Accurate strategy recovery is reliably very high, with only the
Perfect strategies (that make the most specific predictions) not always easily recovered
from samples of 40 trials.

4.2 Descriptive Analyses
The probabilistic nature of weather prediction tasks divorces an animal’s
responding from the feedback contingencies for completing a trial correctly. An animal
can make the optimal response that is most likely to dispense a reward, but receive no
reward. The proportion of trials in which a reward was received can be useful in some
modeling contexts in which rewards are the molecular unit of learning. More useful for
this study was a measure of optimal responding that described the rate at which the
animal made the response that was most likely to cause a pellet to be dispensed. Such a
measure describes, post-hoc, mature animal learning in the task. Greater-than-chance
use of the optimal response suggests structured learning of the relationships among cues,
responses, and outcomes.
Figure 4.2 presents a visualization of the proportion of trials in which an animal
made the optimal response in each block, of each experiment, by each monkey. Each cell
describes an experiment (i.e., Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b, etc.), with the proportion of
trials in which the optimal response was made to all cue patterns on the y-axis of the cell
(ranging from no use of the optimal response to 100% use of the optimal response),
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successive blocks presented along the x-axis of the cell, and a dashed line denoting chance
use of the optimal response. Heavy black lines denote borders between Experiments 1, 2,
3, and 4. Different line colors were used based on the number of experiments completed
by a monkey. Monkey names are listed on the y-axis of the figure.
Tables 4.3-6 report additional descriptive statistics for Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The grand mean and standard deviation of the proportion of trials the
optimal response was made were computed using the observed proportions of each of the
25 blocks of 40 trials (25 x 40 = 1,000 blocks per experiment). The grand mean and
standard deviation of response latency (time between stimulus onset and response, with
outliers >7 sec removed) were computed in the same manner.
Many animals (e.g., Han, Hank) never deviated from chance use of the optimal
response. Many other animals (e.g., Albert throughout Experiment 2, Ingrid and Griffin
throughout Experiments 1 and 2) demonstrated use of optimal responses at chance rates
in early blocks of an experiment but at much higher rates as the experiment continued.
The plotted data often form a characteristic, “lowercase m” shape. These individuals
seemingly learned something of the relationships among cues, responses, and outcomes,
with optimal response rates increasing over time as a result. When these relationships
changed at the start of a new experiment, optimal response rates returned to chance and
the animal began the learning process anew. The descriptive data suggest that many
animals learned to use the optimal response at above-chance levels within the various
experiments.
Visual inspection and conventional statistical analyses of these optimal response
proportions in comparison to chance only inconsistently describes how these animals
solved the task. For example, a multilevel logistic regression model could estimate the
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effects of individual differences, cue information, task experience, and any number of
other variables on likelihood of selecting one response or another. This analysis would
output correlation coefficients for individual parameters and individual animals, and
faithfully identify experiments in which observed use of the optimal response differed
from chance. But such an analysis would strain to effectively describe the root cause of a
network of correlation coefficients. That a monkey learned to use the optimal response in
Experiment 2a, then again in Experiment 2b, is largely tangential to the question of how,
qualitatively, the animal completed the task. The strategy analyses, however, can identify
these more qualitative differences.

4.3 Experiment 1 Strategy Analysis
Twenty capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 1,
combining to produce 594 blocks of responses that used cue information in an identifiably
strategic way. A visualization of the best fit strategies for each block of responses by each
monkey is presented in Figure 4.3. Cue-based strategies were overwhelmingly those that
used one cue to guide all responses. Many monkeys used a Single-cue Strong strategy in
which one response was made when a specific high validity cue was present, and the
opposite response was made otherwise. At other times the Strong Singleton strategy was
adopted, in which optimal responses were made only when one of the cues with highest
predictive validity was the only cue presented.
Although this experiment functioned as a series of replications of Whitham and
Washburn (2020), some patterns of responding were markedly different. Use of [Strong]
Singleton strategies was not reported in that design, but was evidenced by several
monkeys that used cue-based strategies in Experiment 1 (none of these monkeys was
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included in the previous weather prediction design). The strategies used by those
monkeys that used cue-based strategies did not change across the five iterations of the
task.

4.4 Experiment 2 Strategy Analysis
Ten capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 2, in
which ITIs, timeouts, and cue validities were adjusted. These animals combined to
produce 274 blocks of responses that used cue information in an identifiably strategic
way. A visualization of the best fit strategies for each block of responses by each monkey
is presented in Figure 4.4. These [null] effects are noteworthy because, unlike in the
mechanically identical manipulations of Experiment 1, Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and
2e each manipulated either the reward rate or the validities of the cues. Importantly, there
was no evidence for a change in strategy distribution towards new or more sophisticated
strategy use was observed with these changes, and the rate of non-Single Cue strategy use
remained very low. Changes to reward rate and cue validity also did not cause higher rates
of cue-based strategy use. One capuchin monkey, Lily, that used cues strategically in
Experiment 1 ceased to do so in Experiment 2, while a second capuchin monkey, Albert,
started using cue information strategically in Experiment 2 after not doing so in
Experiment 1.
Curiously, both Griffin (capuchin) and Ingrid’s (capuchin) Single Cue Strong
strategy adoption was strongest when the validity of the strong cues was weakest, in
Experiment 2e. The reasons for this are unclear, and may represent artifacts of fitful data
collection, but this result minimally demonstrates that the more equivalent validities of
the four cues in Experiments 2d and 2e were tractable to the animals. That is, even though
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the animals overwhelming used single, strongly predictive cues to guide cue-based
strategy use, and even though these experiments presented strongly predictive cues that
were not as strong as in other experiments, these animals still made reliable use of singlecue strategies. This is a novel demonstration, given that manipulation of cue validities is
very rare in probabilistic categorization designs, and that the cue validities and
probability table of Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) (see Table 3.1) has been used in
nearly every published probabilistic categorization task.

4.5 Experiment 3 Strategy Analysis
Nine capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 3, in
which the cues were spatially contiguous or were depicted as photographs of conspecific
faces or bodies. Together, these animals combined to produce 197 blocks of responses that
used cue information in an identifiably strategic way. A visualization of the best fit
strategies for each block of responses by each monkey is presented in Figure 4.5. The
responses of each of Griffin (capuchin), Ingrid (capuchin), and Obi (rhesus) were
consistently best fit in this experiment by strategies that use multiple cues, with the three
animals best fit by these strategies ~93%, ~92%, and ~85% of blocks in the latter half of
Experiment 3a, respectively.
Obi was identified as using a Singleton-Prototype strategy that, despite inclusion
in analyses of Meeter and colleagues (2006, 2008) and Whitham and Washburn (2020),
had never been previously reported to be a good fit to human or animal probabilistic
categorization data. The Singleton-Prototype strategy predicted optimal responses to cue
combinations in which only one cue was onscreen, or those in which two cues were
onscreen that predicted the same response. A restricted subset of these rhesus macaques
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had taken part in many thousands of discrete categorization tasks with spatially localized,
polygonal stimuli of similar appearance to those of Experiment 3a, and Obi’s data are
often strongly represented in these designs (e.g., Smith et al., 2012). Obi may have been
uniquely sensitive to this manipulation, and non-representative of strategy use in weather
prediction tasks.
But this fact of the animals' experimental history was not true of Ingrid and Griffin.
Instead, presenting the cues more locally may have caused a greater proportion of the cue
information to be attended to among these three animals that, across all experiments,
were generally more attentive to the task overall. The spatially localized, polygonal cues
of Experiment 3a may have facilitated slightly more global processing of the cues and their
associated validities, as intended. Besides the aforementioned cue-based strategy use in
Experiment 3a, the experimental manipulations of Experiment 3 had no effect on the
distribution or speed of cue-based strategy use. Instead, use of the more unfamiliar
stimulus images in the rest of Experiment 3 seemed to be less interesting or tractable to
the animals, and strategic use of cues was nearly entirely absent.

4.6 Experiment 4 Strategy Analysis
Five capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 4, which
extended the ITI and timeous manipulations of Experiment 2. These animals combined
to produce 246 blocks of responses that used cue information in an identifiably strategic
way. A visualization of the best fit strategies for each block of responses by each monkey
is presented in Figure 4.6. Experiment 4’s extension of Experiment 2’s reward rate
manipulations resulted in cue-based strategy use by five monkeys – Applesauce
(capuchin), Irene (capuchin), Murph (rhesus), Liam (capuchin), and Lou (rhesus) - that
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had not demonstrated any appreciable degree of strategy use in Experiments 1, 2, or 3
(Liam, capuchin, used the Single-Cue strategy in unpublished data from the experiment
of Whitham & Washburn, 2020). The changes to these animals’ performance was limited
to their adoption of strategies that other animals used in previous experiments. The
manipulations did not speed up the rate of strategy adoption, nor did they cause adoption
of cue-based strategies that were new to this series of experiments.
The strategy analysis (and descriptive data, see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6) suggests
strongly that Obi (rhesus) used multicue strategies in Experiment 4. In the latter halves
of Experiments 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d, Obi was best fit by multicue strategies ~71% of the time
overall. However, successive blocks were rarely identified as the product of the same
strategy (hence the paucity of plotted points in Figure 4.6, which only depicts multiple
identical strategy identifications in a row). Without this control against strategy
misidentification, the specific implications of this result can only be evaluated with
caution. There are a few reasons why the strategy analysis may have reported such a
diversity of multicue strategy use. Obi might have indeed changed strategies very rapidly
among the multicue strategies, and the strategy analysis faithfully captured this suite of
strategy use. Such a demonstration would be novel but intuitive: maintaining complex
rules across hundreds or thousands of trials is cognitively effortful for humans, and would
likely be more so for a rhesus macaque. Alternatively, Obi's multicue strategy use may
have been consistent throughout, but the strategy analysis failed to identify it reliably.
Analyses of simulated data (see Figure 4.1) discount this possibility somewhat, but a
highly inconsistent adherence rate to a given strategy, for example, could spike the false
identification rates much higher than those depicted in the figure. Finally, it is possible
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that Obi consistently adopted the use of a strategy that was not specified in the strategy
analysis.

4.7 Strategy Analysis Summary
Monkeys that reliably adopted cue-based strategies retained them within an
experiment and often returned to them in each new experiment. Figure 4.7 presents a
simplified Markov State diagram depicting the rates of strategy retention and switching
among three groups of strategies: one group of side-biased blocks (R bias and S bias), one
group of random blocks, and a third group of all blocks in which cue-based strategies were
used. The state transitions depict rates of shifts from use of one of the strategy groups in
a block to a different one of the strategy groups, as well as rates at which that strategy
group was retained. Retention was very high overall, with the likeliest strategy for a block
of responses by a monkey predicting the likeliest strategy for the next block a majority of
the time for a majority of monkeys. Figure 4.8 depicts the proportion of blocks in which
the highest likelihood strategy was the same across two blocks for each monkey, and
overall.
Monkeys that used cue-based strategies did not demonstrate strategy use at earlier
blocks as experience with weather prediction tasks increased. Figures 4.9-10 depict the
block at which a cue-based strategy was acquired (defined as the same strategy having the
highest likelihood for a majority of five successive blocks) for each monkey and overall,
respectively. No obvious relationship existed between cue-based strategy acquisition and
experience in the task. This result, along with the strategy analyses depicted in Figures
4.3-6, suggests no role of practice effects in the task and, instead, repeated measurement
of identical series of behaviors to a series of mechanically identical tasks (with the
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exceptions of Experiments 2d and 2e, which varied the probability table for the task yet
still maintained the general results).

4.8 Other Analyses
Response latencies, both the time from trial onset to response and the total time in
which the joystick was depressed, were also recorded for each trial. Although there were
no specific hypotheses about response latencies, analyses of this additional measure
might capture aspects of the monkeys’ performance in the task to which the strategy
analysis was blind. For example, it may be the case that each strategy entails a certain
amount of processing time, and that response time may be used as a behavioral marker
of strategy use alongside rates of responding to the different cue patterns. Differences in
processing time would perhaps be evidenced in response latencies, and not captured by
the strategy analysis alone (see Tables 4.3-6 for descriptive statistics of response
latencies).
Bayesian modeling was used to detect any differences in response latencies.
Central tendency and scale parameters were estimated to describe the mean and standard
deviation, respectively, of a latent distribution that modeled response latency. These
parameters were estimated once for each of three groups of strategies. One central
tendency and scale pair was estimated for trials in which the strategy analysis suggested
R or S biased responding. A second pair was estimated for trials in which the strategy
analysis suggested random responding. A third pair was estimated for trials in which the
strategy analysis suggested cue-based responding. Because response latencies are heavily
skewed (response latencies can extend to the end of the test session, but never be faster
than around 1 second), two transformations of response latencies were made to facilitate
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modeling (for strengths and weaknesses of this approach, see Grayson, 2004; Lo &
Andrews, 2015). First, only response latencies faster than 7 sec were included in the
analysis. This arbitrary cutoff removes the slowest 7% of trials, that likely represented
monkey behaviors that are not of interest to the present investigation (e.g., drinking
water, taking a nap, interactions with conspecifics, etc.), while preserving response
latencies that could reasonably represent time taken to process the cue information and
make a response. Second, response latencies were natural log transformed to remove
remaining skew from the distribution and sharpen parameter estimates. The response
latencies that capture time from trial onset to response were used, as processing time
could plausibly include times in which the animal was not deflecting the joystick.
Bayesian modeling techniques were used because they offer flexible matching of
analysis to design, emphasize estimation of parameters of interest instead of binary
decision criteria, facilitate identification of where differences demonstrably do not exist
(akin to accepting the null hypothesis in frequentist significance testing), and cope well
with unbalanced designs (Kruschke, 2018; Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a; McElreath, 2020).
Although the central tendency and scale of response latency distributions would be
expected to vary across individual monkeys as well, and thus could have been included in
a Bayesian multilevel model, the severely unbalanced distribution of inferred strategy use
prevented effective modeling of this potential predictor. Some monkeys only very rarely
contributed response latencies due to cue-based strategy use, and the high retention rates
described above made the individual monkeys highly correlated with their strategy of
choice. Adding monkey identity to the model would only convolute measurement of the
strategy group parameters of interest. Analyses were completed using the pandas and
pymc3 packages of Python 3.7 (McKinney, 2011; Salvatier et al., 2016). Parameter
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estimates were made using 20,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo steps (10,000 tuning
steps).
Results of this response latency analysis, with distribution mean estimates
transformed back to the original units (msec), are plotted in Figure 4.11. Trials from
blocks in which side biases were inferred were demonstrably faster than trials from blocks
in which random or cue-based strategies were inferred. Because processing of cues was
likely very low for monkeys employing these side-biased strategies, akin to lever-pressing
on a variable ratio reward schedule, this effect was to be expected. It is more interesting
that no difference was observed between blocks in which random strategies were inferred
and those in which cue-based strategies were inferred. If greater response latency
suggests greater time processing the stimulus information, the equivalent response
latencies of random strategy blocks and cue-based strategy blocks suggests sincere
processing of cue information in random strategy blocks.
This result may suggest use of a strategy that was not specified in the strategy
analysis in these blocks. This failure of model specification and selection would be
analogous to a Type II error – there is structure to the data, but the model is not sensitive
enough to capture it and the analyst erroneously reports no effect. Many animals use winstay and lose-shift strategies in highly serialized tasks with binary response options (e.g.,
Levine, 1959). Figure 4.12 depicts the rate of win-stay/lose-shift strategy use by monkeys
in blocks of random strategy use. As in Whitham and Washburn (2020), no evidence for
use of this particular serial dependency in the monkeys’ responses was observed. Further
descriptive analyses did not reveal any obvious cue dependency in the random blocks as
might suggest specification of an additional, heretofore unidentified strategy. Taken
together these analyses suggest that random strategy use reflected failed attempts to make
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use of the available cue information, or otherwise misinformed guesses, rather than
structured responding using an approach not included in the strategy analysis.
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Table 4.1 Strategies

Description
Random

Each response is made randomly.

R bias

R responses are predicted to every cue combination.

S bias

S responses are predicted to every cue combination.

Singleton

Optimal responses are predicted when only one cue is onscreen.
Random or side-biased responses are predicted when multiple cues are
onscreen.

Single-cue [cue]

The presence or absence of one cue guides all responses - to the
response predicted by that cue if that cue if it is present, or to the
opposite response if it is not present.

Singleton-Prototype

Optimal responses are predicted when one cue is onscreen or two cues
that predict the same response are onscreen.
Random or side-biased responses are predicted when cues that predict
opposite responses are onscreen.

Two v One

Optimal responses are predicted when one cue is onscreen, when two
cues that predict the same response are onscreen, or when two cues that
predict the same response and one cue that predicts the opposite
response are onscreen.
Random or side-biased responses are predicted when cues that predict
opposite responses are onscreen and majority rule cannot guide
responses.

All but Two Strong
Cues

The optimal response is predicted for every cue combination except
those in which both of the strongly predictive cues are onscreen
together.

Perfect

The optimal response is predicted to every cue combination.
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Table 4.2 Cue Patterns, Frequencies, and Strategies. Each row describes the set
of responses a strategy predicts to the different cue patterns. A strategy predicted a
deflection to the R response, the S response, or make no specific prediction (chance rates
of responding among the two two responses, Rand). Cues can be strong (R or S) or weak
(r or s) evidence that a response will be rewarded. The rate at which an animal will be
assumed to adhere to a strategy is not 100%, to allow for anticipated deviations due to
exploratory behavior, probability matching, and other factors. Each strategy predicted
a unique set of R responses, S responses, and random responses to the 14 unique cue
patterns.

Strategies not based on cue
information
Random
R bias
S bias
Strategies based on a single cue
Strong Singleton
Strong Singleton w/ R bias
Strong Singleton w/ S bias
Singleton
Singleton w/ R bias
Singleton w/ S bias
Single-Cue Strong R
Single-Cue Weak R
Single-Cue Weak S
Single-Cue Strong S
Strategies based on multiple cues
Singleton Prototype
Singleton Prototype w/ R bias
Singleton Prototype w/ S bias
Two v One
Two v One w/ R bias
Two v One w/ S bias
All but Two Strong Cards
All but Two Strong Cards w/ R bias
All but Two Strong Cards w/ S bias
Perfect
Perfect w/ R bias
Perfect w/ S bias

Cue Patterns
G
H
I
Cues Present
rs
Rrs
S
RS

A

B

C

D

E

F

J

K

L

M

N

R

r

Rr

s

Rs

rS

RrS

Ss

RSs

rSs

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
S
R
R

Rand
R
S
R
R
R
S
R
R
R

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
R
R
R

Rand
R
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
R

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
S
S
R

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
S
R
S
R

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
R
S
R

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
R
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
S
R
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
S
R
R
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
R
R
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
S
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
S
R
S
S

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
R
R
R
R
R
R

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S

Rand
R
S
Rand
R
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
R
R
R
Rand
R
S
R
R
R

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
S
S
S
Rand
R
S
S
S
S

Rand
R
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1

Albert
Applesauce
Bailey
Benny
Chewie
Gabe
Gambit
Gonzo
Gretel
Griffin
Han
Hank
Ingrid
Ira
Irene
Ivory
Liam
Lily
Logan
Lou
Luke
Lychee
Mason
Murph
Nkima
Obi
Paddy
Widget
Wren

Experiment 1a
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.50
0.06
1924
291
0.50
0.07
2253
396
0.51
0.09
2357
281
0.50
0.08
1301
255
0.50
0.08
1108
150
0.50
0.06
2160
252
0.55
0.08
3665
316
0.53
0.08
2436
302
0.54
0.08
2543
279
0.51
0.09
2526
259
0.52
0.09
2094
402
0.50
0.08
3222
267
0.55
0.09
2531
311
0.51
0.06
2609
438
0.50
0.08
2875
307
0.50
0.10
2610
327
0.57
0.07
2818
291
0.49
0.07
2441
186
0.51
0.09
2355
214
0.48
0.07
2211
287
0.50
0.05
1813
307
0.48
0.09
2698
290
0.51
0.09
2758
411
0.51
0.07
1475
235
0.53
0.08
2425
417
0.53
0.08
2105
326
0.48
0.07
2879
209
0.50
0.09
2047
119
0.52
0.06
2280
310

Experiment 1b
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.51
0.07
1847
270
0.50
0.07
2357
327
0.64
0.16
2194
236
0.50
0.08
1175
177
0.50
0.06
1134
151
0.50
0.07
2273
187
0.56
0.09
3531
366
0.60
0.15
2513
249
0.69
0.17
2738
325
0.64
0.12
2243
253
0.49
0.08
2168
200
0.50
0.07
2959
401
0.77
0.16
2458
366
0.50
0.07
2073
281
0.50
0.05
2305
175
0.50
0.08
2285
211
0.52
0.07
2325
265
0.61
0.16
2176
213
0.52
0.08
2517
241
0.51
0.07
2263
286
0.50
0.06
1805
238
0.48
0.08
2237
214
0.50
0.07
2681
169
0.50
0.08
1636
150
0.50
0.09
1634
423
0.51
0.06
1945
176
0.52
0.08
2985
376
0.50
0.06
1813
232
0.57
0.09
2146
236

Experiment 1c
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.51
0.09
1818
255
0.50
0.08
2212
258
0.50
0.08
1688
613
0.50
0.06
1211
158
0.50
0.08
1185
110
0.50
0.08 2089
217
0.52
0.09
3386
294
0.58
0.12
2515
201
0.49
0.08
2633
274
0.76
0.16
2357
216
0.49
0.05
2232
265
0.50
0.05
2799
228
0.77
0.15
2351
216
0.57
0.13
2083
258
0.48
0.08
2540
219
0.50
0.07
2141
198
0.55
0.07
2261
371
0.59
0.13
2077
208
0.49
0.1
2412
326
0.54
0.06
2713
248
0.50
0.08
1602
241
0.52
0.07
2257
305
0.52
0.09
2583
194
0.49
0.08
1646
135
0.50
0.07
1362
242
0.51
0.08
1809
224
0.58
0.08
2802
448
0.66
0.17
1750
218
0.52
0.11
2024
178

Experiment 1d
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.62
0.12
1857
228
0.50
0.07
2294
220
0.50
0.07
1374
419
0.50
0.07
1166
157
0.49
0.08
1147
119
0.50
0.09
2158
189
0.76
0.16
2983
234
0.82
0.14
2509
269
0.63
0.09
2523
256
0.75
0.15
2150
283
0.49
0.07
1892
273
0.50
0.07
2790
176
0.75
0.19
2408
240
0.80
0.12
2261
229
0.54
0.11
2720
353
0.53
0.09
2061
328
0.50
0.06
1883
224
0.78
0.13
2257
252
0.51
0.06
2555
211
0.53
0.08
2368
265
0.50
0.08
1297
179
0.50
0.08
2277
240
0.48
0.07
2590
131
0.51
0.08
1867
308
0.48
0.1
2626
218
0.49
0.09
2055
317
0.70
0.13
2569
467
0.73
0.13
1779
128
0.71
0.13
2084
147

Experiment 1e
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.65
0.11
1735
213
0.50
0.08
2346
504
0.52
0.09
2026
230
0.50
0.09
1075
87
0.50
0.07
1136
195
0.50
0.07
2065
178
0.79
0.17
3424
280
0.60
0.23
2449
272
0.78
0.12
2265
231
0.66
0.15
2090
346
0.50
0.09
1631
288
0.50
0.06
3015
330
0.79
0.17
2312
264
0.60
0.1
2252
206
0.61
0.13
2775
225
0.51
0.1
2166
329
0.47
0.08
2316
474
0.60
0.12
2085
211
0.58
0.1
2388
215
0.49
0.07
2119
251
0.50
0.08
1450
280
0.49
0.11
2004
219
0.53
0.08 2809
297
0.50
0.08
1510
180
0.48
0.06
2583
255
0.50
0.07
1412
214
0.50
0.08
1070
40
0.80
0.11
1871
213
0.69
0.10
2261
223
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2

Albert
Applesauce
Bailey
Chewie
Gabe
Griffin
Han
Hank
Ingrid
Irene
Ivory
Liam
Lily
Lou
Luke
Murph
Obi
Wren

Experiment 2a
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.75 0.15 2307 601
0.51 0.07 2258 298
0.51 0.07 1644 314
0.50 0.06 1145
97
0.51 0.08 1474 239
0.62 0.11 2251 502
0.51 0.08 2110 349
0.50 0.07 2388 250
0.77 0.16 2955 445
0.56 0.10 2302 316
0.50 0.09 1982 243
0.53 0.08 1756 288
0.49 0.08 2164 279
0.48 0.09 2245 230
0.50 0.07 1796 299
0.52 0.09 1609 171
0.54 0.08 2521 448
0.56 0.09 2272 278

Experiment 2b
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.63 0.12 2353 265
0.50 0.08 2317 261
0.51 0.07 1956 281
0.50 0.07 1158
87
0.50 0.06 1689 263
0.55 0.11 2732 337
0.52 0.08 2007 629
0.50 0.07 2160 312
0.61 0.09 2889 433
0.54 0.10 2281 174
0.54 0.10 2233 313
0.50 0.08 1471 235
0.50 0.07 2428 626
0.49 0.07 2069 212
0.50 0.07 1711 202
0.58 0.07 2101 359
0.58 0.08 2545 370
0.53 0.09 2427 784

Experiment 2c
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.69 0.19 2285 793
0.56 0.14 2511 348
0.49 0.09 1835 210
0.50 0.08 1088
79
0.50 0.07 1919 258
0.57 0.11 2912 284
0.50 0.06 1043
0
0.48 0.07 2602 435
0.47 0.08 3021 231
0.64 0.12 2535 390
0.50 0.07 2008 225
0.51 0.06 1491 230
0.48 0.07 2538 432
0.56 0.09 2468 228
0.50 0.08 1418 291
0.52 0.09 1903 219
0.55 0.08 2424 287
0.42 0.10 2636 356

Experiment 2d
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.6
0.14 2704 310
0.53 0.10 2999 312
0.49 0.09 1973 217
0.51 0.09 1135
98
0.50 0.07 2289 233
0.63 0.12 2718 271
0.50 0.07 1043
0
0.50 0.07 3058 274
0.64 0.22 2319 214
0.50 0.09 2840 331
0.50 0.10 2189 381
0.50 0.08 1415 324
0.50 0.08 1999 238
0.50 0.07 2073 263
0.50 0.08 2002 280
0.49 0.08 1685 281
0.52 0.07 1761
172
0.50 0.08 2524 268

Experiment 2e
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.68 0.15 2533 428
0.50 0.08 2354 242
0.49 0.09 2282 363
0.50 0.07 1145 162
0.50 0.07 2261 210
0.76 0.15 2473 236
0.50 0.07 1043
0
0.49 0.07 2998 352
0.86 0.10 2586 211
0.51 0.08 2301 339
0.50 0.06 1892 301
0.50 0.09 1181
119
0.50 0.08 2252 316
0.49 0.07 2167 301
0.50 0.08 1575 195
0.52 0.09 1307 145
0.50 0.07 1780 249
0.55 0.07 2184 222
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 3

Albert
Applesauce
Bailey
Chewie
Gabe
Griffin
Han
Hank
Ingrid
Irene
Liam
Lily
Lou
Luke
Murph
Obi

Experiment 3a
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.69 0.14 2379 316
0.51 0.06 2416 369
0.50 0.08 2188 268
0.50 0.09 1142 149
0.50 0.05 2177 296
0.82 0.11 2132 146
0.50 0.07 1042
1
0.51 0.05 3061 234
0.73 0.14 2502 177
0.49 0.07 2341 181
0.51 0.07 1933 522
0.50 0.08 2201 180
0.51 0.07 2119 321
0.50 0.07 1498 146
0.50 0.08 1242
94
0.71 0.13 2103 292

Experiment 3b
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.55 0.07 2668 467
0.49 0.07 2540 408
0.51 0.07 2030 168
0.50 0.08 1225 253
0.50 0.06 2155 230
0.53 0.08 2409 323
0.50 0.08 1042
0
0.50 0.09 2924 240
0.52 0.09 2486 186
0.50 0.07 2505 302
0.51 0.06 1992 238
0.50 0.07 2385 530
0.50 0.06 1992 219
0.50 0.06 1711
271
0.51 0.09 1551
216
0.52 0.09 2116 252

Experiment 3c
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.65 0.11 2683 484
0.50 0.09 2652 378
0.49 0.07 1842 272
0.50 0.10 1079
80
0.49 0.08 2141 246
0.56 0.12 2413 335
0.50 0.07 1043
0
0.50 0.08 2903 244
0.49 0.07 2653 228
0.60 0.07 2403 308
0.51 0.09 1747 130
0.50 0.09 2037 171
0.48 0.08 1902 247
0.50 0.08 1678 207
0.53 0.08 1282 136
0.55 0.09 1519 327

Experiment 3d
p(Optimal)
Latency
M
SD
M
SD
0.60 0.13 2157 451
0.51 0.09 2272 290
0.49 0.10 1778 255
0.50 0.08 1031
13
0.50 0.09 2313 432
0.70 0.17 2104 188
0.51 0.09 1769 402
0.50 0.07 3058 316
0.47 0.08 2466 291
0.57 0.06 2529 331
0.50 0.10 1715
187
0.50 0.06 2150 364
0.51 0.08 2130 191
0.50 0.08 1611
184
0.52 0.08 1621 154
0.60 0.13 1578
177
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Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 4

Experiment 4a
p(Optimal)

Experiment 4b

Latency

p(Optimal)

Experiment 4c

Latency

p(Optimal)

Experiment 4d

Latency

p(Optimal)

Latency

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Applesauce

0.60

0.10

1988

289

0.51

0.07

2434

334

0.50

0.08

2610

525

0.77

0.08

2263

294

Chewie

0.50

0.08

1087

73

0.50

0.06

1055

30

0.50

0.07

1232

200

0.50

0.07

1257

212

Han

0.52

0.08

2257

207

0.54

0.08

2283

233

0.52

0.09

1388

402

0.51

0.08

1820

688

Hank

0.51

0.07

2865

207

0.51

0.09

2414

254

0.50

0.06

2235

171

0.50

0.09

2458

334

Ingrid

0.46

0.10

2499

204

0.48

0.06

2723

157

0.47

0.10

3039

415

0.53

0.11

3177

417

0.57

0.09

1967

195

0.53

0.12

2291

244

0.68

0.20

2394

242

0.61

0.10

2457

382

0.68

0.11

2381

237

0.76

0.11

2390

296

0.50

0.08

1832

212

0.52

0.07

2080

404

0.50

0.07

2315

570

Irene
Liam

missing data
0.57

Lily

0.12

2203

660

missing data

Lou

0.51

0.09

2280

271

0.46

0.08

2172

239

0.51

0.08

2237

246

0.78

0.15

2261

183

Luke

0.50

0.07

2111

445

0.50

0.09

1572

245

0.50

0.09

1956

476

0.50

0.07

1767

397

Murph

0.60

0.14

1515

372

0.64

0.11

1972

390

0.74

0.11

2199

284

0.83

0.07

2227

231

Obi

0.71

0.10

2114

311

0.73

0.09

1880

200

0.74

0.15

2176

305

0.76

0.11

2141

303
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Figure 4.1 Simulated strategy recovery. The strategy used to simulate response
data is printed in the top-right corner of each plot. ‘Exact’ recoveries are the rate at
which the strategy analysis recovered the exact strategy that was used to simulate
response data. ‘Strategy’ recoveries are the rate at which the strategy analysis identified
the correct strategy except for misidentifying the presence or absence of any S or R
biases. Both of these types of recoveries are accurate. In ‘Other’ recoveries the strategy
that was used to generate the data was misidentified. Figure adapted from Whitham &
Washburn (2020).
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Figure 4.2. Response optimality. The y-axis of each plot depicts the proportion
of trials in which the optimal response was used in each experiment by each monkey.
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Figure 4.3 Strategy use in Experiment 1. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped into
four bins for plotting on the y-axis: no cue use (random or side-biased strategies), use of one cue (single-cue or singleton
strategies), use of multiple cues (singleton-prototype, two vs one), or [nearly] perfect strategies (all but two strong cards
and perfect strategies). The eight capuchin monkeys on the left side of the plot used cues in their responding substantially
more than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment accordingly. Note that
these bins are only for visualization purposes, and were not incorporated into the modeling.
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Figure 4.4 Strategy use in Experiment 2. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped in the
same way as in Figure 4.3. The three capuchin monkeys on the left side of the figure used cues in their responding
substantially more than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment
accordingly.
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Figure 4.5 Strategy use in Experiment 3. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped in the
same way as Figure 4.3. The four monkeys on the left side of the figure used cues in their responding substantially more
than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment accordingly.
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Figure 4.6 Strategy use in Experiment 4. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped in the
same way as Figure 4.3. The five monkeys on the left side of the figure used cues in their responding substantially more
than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment accordingly.
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Figure 4.7 Simplified Markov state diagram. Arrows denote block-over-block
rates of switching and retention among R or S biased strategies, the random strategy,
and cue-based strategies.
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Figure 4.8 Strategy retention rates by individual monkeys and overall.
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Figure 4.9 Strategy acquisition by experiment for each monkey. Black diamonds denote the block at which a
majority of the highest likelihood strategies for the previous 5 blocks were the same, cue-based strategy. Experiments are
depicted along the x-axis, with each tick one of the 1000 trial experiments (e.g., Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b, etc.). No
obvious relationship exists between experiments and strategy acquisition. Monkeys did not use strategies earlier in
experiments as they acquired more experience with the task.
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Figure 4.10 Strategy acquisition by Experiment for all monkey. Black diamonds denote the block at which a
majority of the highest likelihood strategies for the previous 5 blocks were the same, cue-based strategy for a monkey, in
an experiment. These data are the same as in Figure 4.9, and many monkeys contributed multiple points to this plot by
demonstrating strategy acquisition multiple times across the many experiments. Experiments are depicted along the xaxis, with each tick one of the 1000-block experiments. No obvious relationship exists among the points, such that animals
did not acquire strategies more quickly across repeated exposures to the various weather predictions tasks.
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Figure 4.11 Central tendency of response latency distributions. Blocks were clustered as the product of side-biased,
random, or cue-based strategies. The black diamond denotes the mean central tendency. Transparent grey diamonds are
average monkey response latencies in a block inferred to be the product of the strategy group on the x-axis, included only
as a reference to the distribution of the raw data. Random jitter along the x-axis was added to the grey diamonds to make
a greater portion of the mean response latencies from blocked trials visible.
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Figure 4.12 Win-stay or lose-shift strategy use. The height of each bar is the proportion of trials by each monkey in
which a response in accordance with a win-stay or lose-shift strategy was observed in blocks of random strategy use. The
dashed line indicates chance use of a win-stay or lose-shift strategy.
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Discussion

This dissertation was conceived of as an attempt to identify the cognitive,
perceptual, and motivational determinants of monkey behavior in a probabilistic
categorization task. The unique challenges to learning posed by both probabilistic and
categorization tasks made the effective sample size (i.e., the number of unique individuals
that contributed informationally rich data) of this series of experiments lower than
anticipated across all experiments. Despite the sample size, conclusions from this series
of studies are clear. Evidence for each of the potential determinants of the monkeys’
behavior will be evaluated and discussed in turn.

5.1 Cognitive Determinants
Hypothesis I: Strategy use during probabilistic categorization is a stable trait of an
individual animal, and the same strategies used by an animal in one weather prediction
task will be those used in another task.

Strategy use in probabilistic categorization tasks by individual monkeys was highly
stable across blocks and experiments. Of critical concern to Hypothesis I, monkey strategy
use did not at all resemble a series of random draws from the bank of specified strategies,
or from any subset thereof with a length of more than one or two. Moreover, this was true
to a similar extent for each monkey that demonstrated cue-based strategy use. No
monkey, with the possible exception of Obi (rhesus) in Experiment 4, sampled widely
among the available strategies within or across experiments. Hypothesis I was overall
well-supported.
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However, contra Hypothesis I, monkeys did not evidence the rich interindividual
variability in clustered individual differences that would suggest that use of “trait” would
be appropriate. Instead, the various plausible determinants of nonhuman primate
strategy use (e.g., selective attention, associative learning ability) seemingly do little to
avert species-wide convergence to the same few, highly similar strategies. These results
predict that the same strategies used by a species in one weather prediction task are
strongly predictive of strategy use by that species in every weather prediction task.

Hypothesis II: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an
individual's preferred strategy, and titration of overall reward rate in the task will
titrate strategy use accordingly. Specifically, the animals that used Random or SideBias strategies in Experiment 1 will use cue information to guide responding in
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c.

In accordance with Hypothesis II, strategy use was sensitive to experimental
manipulations to reward rate. However, the sensitivity was only demonstrated to affect
adoption of a Single-Cue strategy. When many animals that had not previously
demonstrated cue-based strategy use began using cue-based strategies at the most
extreme reward rates tested, in Experiment 4, they were observed only to adopt those
strategies that other individuals were already using. These manipulations had no
demonstrable effect on the observed distribution of cue-based strategies, the complexity
of strategy use, or the speed of strategy adoption.
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Hypothesis III: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an
individual's preferred strategy, and a set of more egalitarian cue probabilities will beget
greater multicue responding in the animals that readily use strategies. Animals that do
not readily use strategies will revert to Random or Side-biased strategies.

Hypothesis III was not supported. Experiments 2d and 2e presented animals with
a set of probabilistic relationships among cues, responses, and outcomes in which the
most highly predictive cues were less predictive than in other experiments, and the least
predictive cues were more predictive than in other experiments. This manipulation did
not cause more diverse, complex, or rapid strategy use.
Trends in the individual animals’ strategy use seem to suggest that individual
differences in learning rate could bear strongly on the observed rates of strategy adoption
by the animals. Although the different animals largely arrived at use of the same strategy
if they were going to use cues, how many trials were required before they used the cues
reliably seemed to vary across individuals. Here, learning rate is used in the most rote
associative and parametric of senses. Because such a learning rate is exclusively based on
observation of behavior, it could be alternatively conceptualized not as reflecting the rate
of internalization of cue information but instead as the rate of utilization of what
information was learned (Speekenbrink et al., 2008). The source of any differences in
learning rate could reasonably originate with differences in leveraging of attention,
memory for what the animal did in previous trials, or any number of other, equivalently
plausible cognitive constructs.
Consider the strategy analysis results from Experiment 2 for Ingrid (capuchin),
Albert (capuchin), and Chewie (rhesus) (Figure 4.4). Ingrid reliably used Single-Cue
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strategies in Experiment 2a and 2e from a very early block through the end of that
experiment. Albert adopted use of the same Single-Cue strategy more fitfully, and nearer
to the end of Experiments 2a, 2c, and 2d. Chewie did not evidence use of any strategy, but
did reliably use Single-Cue strategies at higher block numbers in Whitham and Washburn
(2020). Each of these observations fits neatly within an account of strategy use as
dependent on a more global learning rate parameter. In such a conception, Ingrid learned
one cue’s predictive validity rapidly and utilized it into Single-Cue responding for the
remainder of the experiment. Instantiation of such a parameter may also explain Ingrid’s
absent/decremented strategy use in other experiments, if what was internalized at an
early trial was that no cue has predictive validity to either response. If Albert’s
hypothetical learning rate parameter was lower, cue information would be learned more
slowly, and cue-based strategy use would be evident only late in experiments. If Chewie’s
learning rate was lower still, 1,000 trials of cue exposure could be insufficient for any
demonstration of cue-based strategy use to emerge.
The apparent ceiling on the complexity of strategy use in probabilistic
categorization may be underpinned by cognitive and associative mechanisms with a much
longer history of experimental study. Conditioned blocking designs describe the
remarkable degree to which cue information that does not contribute uniquely to a known
cue/response relationship will not be acquired despite extensive opportunity for learning
(Kamin, 1968; Kruschke, 2003). In such a design a participant first learns that cue A is
strongly predictive of response 1 being rewarded, then is repeatedly exposed to cue A and
cue B simultaneously, with response 1 still rewarded. Even though the participant
experiences that cue B is also perfectly predictive of response 1 being rewarded, probe
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trials with cue B reveal that participants do not behave as if cue B is perfectly predictive
in this way.
A conception of probabilistic categorization in which utilization of single cues acts
as a prerequisite for use of multiple cues, or even that learning of single cues is simply
more likely than use of multiple cues, may inadvertently transform any weather
prediction task into an approximation of a conditioned blocking design. In such a
conception, learning of the first cue precludes learning of additional cues, even though
the additional cues may be just as valid (and certainly contribute unique information
relevant to optimal performance on the task). This synergy between observed strategy use
and conditioned blocking designs is not perfect. Conditioned blocking designs typically
require that the first cue learned is perfectly (or very highly) predictive of the response,
and by definition no weather prediction task has this feature. That the first cue is not
perfect, and thus does not perfectly block learning of other cues, may be what allows many
humans to develop multicue responding. Across training, human participants may come
to learn that the single cue-response relationship that they have learned is imperfect and
“unblock” attention to other cues. However, animal learning is not prevented by initial
learning in many other tasks in which animals spontaneously evidence new or superior
cognition as performance matures. Moreover, in the best evidence for multicue strategy
use among these experiments (Obi’s Experiment 4), use of multiple cues was not preceded
by use of less complex strategies. If, when animals do use multicue strategies, they do so
right away, the initial conditioning phase of the blocking design would not occur.
Although these notes prevent conditioned blocking from entirely explaining the observed
pattern of results, any conditioned gating of attention to other cues may have contributed
to the overall lack of use of multiple cues by the monkeys.
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Information theory, more broadly, can present the problem of probabilistic
categorization in similarly clarifying terms. The information yielded by a highly predictive
cue was very high – offering an animal reward rates that were nearly at ceiling in most
experiments from what would otherwise be the floor of chance responding. But once a
valid cue was learned and utilized, learning a second, equally highly predictive cue offered
the animal very little new information relevant to its decision-making. Although the
superior reward rates yielded by the breadth of multicue strategies and the many patterns
in which cue information might have appeared ensured that the informational and reward
value of multicue learning was never literally absent, it may have been functionally so in
many or all experiments.
It is also true that while experimenter and reviewer have omniscient insight into
the structure of the task and the minor superiority of multicue strategy use, the monkeys
likely lacked any such insight. To highly experimentally savvy animals, a task in which
rewards are being dispensed at above-chance levels is solved. Moreover, successfully
ignoring cue information that is not part of the selected, above-chance solution is a skill
in many tasks that may feature irrelevant or incongruous cue information. Note that these
considerations from information theory are important only to accounts in which strategic
use of multiple cues develops incrementally from strategic use of single cues. Although
this progression is what has been previously demonstrated in weather prediction tasks
with humans, and was hypothesized in this study, it is not any exclusive way in which
multiple items of cue information may be utilized. Presentation of weather prediction
tasks to other species, or of weather prediction cues to primates in other experimental or
naturalistic contexts, may reveal other routes through which strategic use of multiple cues
develops.
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The discrepancy between the cues with the highest predictive validity and the cues
with lower predictive validity was intended, and is part of the challenge of situations in
which multiple sources of information can be productively synthesized. To return briefly
to examples presented in Chapter I, the metrics that might commonly be highly predictive
of student success or scholarly quality are imperfect. Some students with high
standardized test scores will fall short of predicted achievement, and some impressive
citation metrics do not reflect incredible contributions to science. Other metrics might
have predicted these discrepancies. Nuance in evaluating the relative validity of multiple
competing sources of information, and facilitating use of multiple sources of information
most effectively when a single source would seemingly suffice, is a very desirable set of
human behaviors. The present results do little to provide direct recommendations for
producing this desirable type of learning and responding. To the extent that the observed
strategy use of the capuchin monkeys and rhesus macaques might model that of humans
in these novel manipulations to the task, none of primary reinforcement manipulation,
cue manipulation, practice effects, or naturally occurring individual differences in
attention, memory, or other relevant cognitive competencies are seemingly fruitful
predictors of multicue strategy use. A set of experiments with human participants that
manipulated weather prediction tasks in the same ways as this dissertation would bear
much more strongly on this more applied dimension of the study of probabilistic
categorization.
Any direct mapping between the performance of monkeys and humans on the task
should be made with extreme caution. Humans have evidenced markedly different, and
markedly more multicue, strategy use than did the monkeys of this series of experiments.
As reviewed in Chapter 1, some humans come to evidence some use of multicue strategies
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in as few as 200 total trials. Differences in the framing of the task may explain part of this
distinction, as in many probability evaluation tasks (Nickerson, 2004). Those tasks that
frame the cues as symptoms and the responses as fictional diagnoses, or the cues as
human features and the responses as preferred ice cream flavors, would seem to make
clear to human participants in very explicit, very linguistically-embedded way that each
cue offers something unique to prediction of the response. This distinction aside, this
series of experiments gave the animals dozens of opportunities, and unique incentives, to
do what humans do in mechanically identical tasks relatively spontaneously, yet the
animals never did so. This result, alongside the demonstration by Newell and colleagues
(2011) of the primary role of explicit cognition in probabilistic categorization and related
comparative data reviewed by Hampton and colleagues (2020), suggests much more
strongly that differences in ability to leverage explicit cognition drives the observed
species differences in probabilistic categorization. Animals do learn to use multiple
informative cues to guide their responses, as robust literatures on contextual cuing and
cognitive control demonstrate exhaustively (e.g., Smith & Beran, 2018). It is in the
domain of this dissertation, the rare (in published cognition literature) or common (in
human and monkey ecology) situation in which cues conflict and underspecify the
outcome, that such a demonstration remains elusive.
If these results reflect a fundamentally cognitive difference between humans and
monkeys, the specific nature of that difference likely reflects a unique, qualitative
difference in learning (Rumbaugh, 1971). Comparative cognition is the study of many
such differences, qualitative and quantitative alike, yet so severe a distinction among
these species in a task with seemingly little language engagement is more unusual. A
design in which human participants completed a standard weather prediction task under
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conditions of articulatory suppression (e.g., verbally repeating "1, 2, 3, 4, a, b, c, d") might
reveal some latent language engagement in the task. That the task not only engages
explicit learning faculties more than it does implicit learning faculties, but also goes
further still to engage high-level use of language, would be an unreported dimension to
the task. This would add additional color to previously reported relationships between
language impairments and probabilistic categorization. Those reports were motivated by
the ostensible mediation of both language impairment and the weather prediction task by
implicit, procedural processes, but may instead reflect the direct influence of language on
weather prediction performance.
These data and analyses facilitate only speculation about the source of individual
differences in strategy adoption across monkeys. No obvious effects of animal age or sex
were observed, but formal analyses of any effect of these parameters are precluded by the
small sample sizes. The visualizations of the strategy analysis outputs (Figures 4.3-6)
suggest a clear difference between the strategy use of capuchins and rhesus macaques in
these experiments. That the capuchin monkeys were demonstrably superior in leveraging
cognition of probable explicit nature is noteworthy, given that the species is often less
adept with other tasks described in such terms (e.g., Smith et al., 2009, Smith et al., 2018).
This superiority is largely relative, however; the capuchin monkeys did not evidence any
rule-based cognition that they have not previously demonstrated in discrete
categorization tasks (e.g., Smith et al., 2012) or the probabilistic categorization task of
Whitham and Washburn (2020). Instead, it was the rhesus macaques that sharply
diverged from species norms on categorization and decision-making tasks of this kind.
Absent other behavioral evidence from the rhesus macaques, unanticipated tumult in
their housing, uncharacteristically low-quality responses to this and other concurrent
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computerized cognitive-behavioral tasks, and other unaccounted motivational factors
(described below) likely drove the apparent species difference to a much greater degree
than any purely cognitive factor.

5.2 Perceptual Determinants
Hypothesis IV: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and design
considerations that have been demonstrated to engender multicue perception will
engender multicue strategy use.

The data from Griffin (capuchin), Ingrid (capuchin), and Obi (rhesus) in
Experiment 3a support Hypothesis IV. Presentation of all cue information as one,
spatially-contiguous percept seemed to engender cue-based responding on the basis of
more than one cue among a subset of animals that were already using single-cue strategies
effectively. Further methodological considerations could do much to shrink the gulf
between the strategy use of monkeys in this series of tasks and what is reported of
humans. Multiple discrete cues (i.e., individual clipart images) were exclusively used in
these and other weather prediction tasks purposefully. Multiple separable, and
potentially opposing, cues must be synthesized in the ecologically relevant problems that
the task purports to model. In the canonical example, of predicting rainy weather, one
uses the discrete and separable cues of overhead cloud cover, the recent weather report,
and whether passersby have raincoats to estimate whether rain is likely. Despite this deep
embedding of use of discrete cues in the probabilistic categorization literature, it is
possible that this format is simply incongruous with how monkey perception receives cue
information. A weather prediction task in which the four cues were configured as
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dimensional properties of a single stimulus might more faithfully detect their
probabilistic categorization abilities without any corrupting influence of local precedence.
For example, a single cue that varies in shape (e.g., rectangle vs trapezoid), orientation
(e.g., upright vs horizontal), x-axis position onscreen (e.g., left vs right side of screen), and
y-axis position onscreen (e.g., upper vs lower portion of screen) could represent each of
the cue configurations of conventional weather prediction tasks. Such an arrangement is
not without precedent in study of probabilistic categorization (e.g., Kruschke & Johansen,
1999), and may be uniquely well-suited for comparative study of monkeys’ cognition.
It is possible that monkeys’ predisposition to process perceptual information more
locally did not cause the observed pattern of results in Experiment 3a. With only 13 total
cue patterns, and therefore 13 unique percepts, the strategies used by these animals may
be equally well-described as an “explicit memorization of unique category memberships”
strategy. Animals are known to excel at learning how to map far greater numbers of
unique stimuli to category memberships in ways that are not necessarily subject to the
algorithmic cue weighting that probabilistic categorization ostensibly demands (e.g.,
Herrnstein et al., 1976). A requisite limitation of the manipulations of Experiment 3 was
the lack of any mechanism with which to validate that the manipulation had functioned
as intended. That is, although available literature suggested that attempting to subvert
global/local biases or increase stimulus salience were worthwhile manipulations given the
species and cognitions under study, no data from this study can estimate either the
magnitude of global/local biases or the degree to which they were subverted (or whether
order effects not captured by Experiment 1 went on to contribute to the observed strategy
elaboration in Experiment 3a). Instead, these data provide compelling evidence that
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further explorations of the role of primate perceptual norms will be important to any
further exploration of probabilistic categorization.

Hypothesis V: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and cues that are
qualitatively different than those of other experiments (socially-interesting rather than
asocial; discrete rather than abstract; inherently salient rather than sterilely
controlled) should engender qualitatively different strategy use.

Hypothesis V was not supported. Manipulation of neither the orientation nor the
identity of the cue information caused strategy use to become more frequent or more
complex. In contrast, those animals that completed previous experiments strategically
often failed to do so in the same way in Experiment 3. Those animals that did not use cuebased strategies in previous experiments were not prompted to do so by the ostensibly
perceptual manipulations of Experiment 3. The salience manipulations of Experiment 3c
and 3d were perhaps particularly fraught. Sourcing images from public databases for use
on spectrographically uncalibrated computer monitors ensured that the color and
luminance of the images were only inconsistently faithful to the color and luminance
information in the scene being depicted, and highly unfaithful to the species under study
(Stevens et al., 2009). The highly artificial nature of those images likely made them much
more akin to the clipart images of the other experiments than was originally intended
(although see Talbot et al., 2016, for a demonstration of capuchin monkeys’ ability to
recognize and adaptively to use similarly formatted images). Any corrupting influence of
these perceptual considerations was likely minor, but one of many contributors to lower
than expected data quality. If feasible, any future exploration into this manipulation
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should maximize the fidelity to real color and luminance of any digital images that are
expected to function via their fidelity to real color and luminance.
The near-exclusive use of single cues among monkeys that used cue-based
strategies is not without precedent in other perceptual tasks. In comparative perception,
the same predisposition of monkeys to perceive local stimulus features rather than more
global properties that motivated the manipulations of Experiments 3a and 3b can be
readily conceptualized as a more modular form of Single-cue strategy use. The
experimental evidence that was used to justify Experiment 3b, specifically, in which faces
are sometimes found to be a class of stimuli that are processed more globally and
holistically than other manner of stimuli, are party to their own flavor of nonhuman
primates’ single-cue superiority. In human gaze perception research, participants use
both the head orientation and ratio of iris to visible sclera to make gaze judgments
(Emery, 2000). In limited testing nonhuman primates have not been demonstrated to do
so, and instead seem to ignore head direction in favor of the single cue of iris/sclera
(Tomonaga & Imura, 2010).

5.3 Motivational Determinants
Of least theoretical interest to the study of probabilistic categorization were
motivational determinants. In few situations would we expect complex cognition to
increase as motivation decreases. Moreover, motivation may have been directly
dependent on strategy use in the task: some of the animals that in Experiment 1 appeared
most primed to demonstrate variable or complex strategy use in later experiments nearly
universally failed to complete all later experiments.
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Lower, but still high, levels of responding on the basis of no cue information were
reported in the mechanically identical task of Whitham and Washburn (2020). Many
animals in each study, including some animals that participated in both projects,
seemingly evaluated the rate of pellet reward of side-biased or random responding as
worthwhile. The manipulations to reward rate that were already included in the planned
series of tasks reduced the rate of this behavior only inconsistently. Unfortunately,
correction trials after incorrect responses could not be incorporated into the design (as
recommended by Smith et al., 2012) without thwarting the meticulously controlled
cue/response relationships on which weather prediction tasks are based.
The discrepancy between the rates of responding on the basis of no cue
information in Whitham and Washburn (2020) and this series of tasks is more curious.
Because 1,000 trials represented the extent of animals’ experience with each experiment
in each series of the present tasks, but represented “early learning” in the task of Whitham
and Washburn, it is possible that this dissertation oversampled animals’ earliest learning
of a new task. Random or side-biased responses should be evident in these earliest trials,
in the absence of any learning of cue information that could direct responding otherwise.
However, those animals in both datasets that demonstrated use of cue based responding
did so as early as in the first few blocks of a new experiment. A priori, few interindividual
differences in learning rate within a species are of such magnitude as to require dozensfold differences in exposure to cue information for equivalently-complex responses to be
made. This suggests even more strongly that the disparity in cue-based strategy use is one
downstream from motivational factors of the monkeys and unquantified factors of their
testing. Many of the same animals, tested two years later on a mechanically identical set
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of tasks, demonstrated markedly different appetites for using their cognitive and
perceptual powers to bolster their reward rate in the task.
It is difficult, but not impossible, for future work to account better for these
considerations. Because Experiment 4 demonstrated that (for some monkeys) there is
some reward rate at which responses that are not based on cue information will give way
to cue-based responding, it is perhaps reasonable to port these more extreme ITI and
timeout durations to every experiment, for every monkey. However, just as the same
parameter values of Whitham and Washburn (2020) were not sufficient to encourage the
same degree of strategic responding in this dissertation, there is little reason to believe
that any combination of parameter values will suit different animals (or the same animal
at two different times) equally well. This challenge is common throughout comparative
psychological study of animals with as many individual differences (and as rich a
nontesting life, complete with variable diet, hormonal cycles, social forces, etc.) as
nonhuman primates. The specific questions of this dissertation, ones of experimental
manipulations’ effect on individual monkeys’ ability and inclination to deploy strategies
of heretofore undocumented complexity, make the moving target of subjective motivation
especially relevant. The design of this dissertation, in which reinforcement factors were
rigorously controlled for but subjective motivation seemingly varied in uncontrolled and
unmeasured fashion, leaves open the possibility that monkey would not demonstrate
multicue strategy use, not necessarily that they could not. Evidence from Experiment 4
falls short of justifying this last point, as the most extreme adjustments to reward rate
only attenuated the most motoric, least cognitive of response strategies; they did not elicit
any unique strategy use.
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5.4 General Discussion
This dissertation builds on the work of Whitham and Washburn (2020) to suggest
much more strongly that monkeys are Single-Cue strategy users to an exceptional degree.
Primates have proven to be accomplished rule-users in a variety of previous
categorization tasks, dating to the earliest laboratory-based descriptions of rhesus
monkey behavior (Hoffman et al., 2009; Kinnaman, 1902). That they were repeatedly
demonstrated to lean heavily on simple rules when relationships among cues and
responses were complex, probabilistic, and, perhaps, perceptually difficult to discern, fits
neatly alongside existing scholarship in comparative and cognitive psychologies.
The niche modeling used to produce this result is but one of many published
procedures for analyzing probabilistic categorization data. The models largely produce
similar results, given the same inputs, and the explanatory virtues that drove selection of
the strategy analysis perspective employed in the preceding analyses held true. That said,
every model is imperfect, and other parameters and models might offer additional
insights into this design and others of its kind.
In the few cases in which strategic use of multiple cues was identified by the
strategy analysis above, analyzing blocks of greater than or fewer than 40 trials might
have been clarifying. Use of 40 trial blocks was informed but arbitrary. An analysis of
smaller block sizes would be better able to detect strategies that are changing rapidly,
whereas an analysis of larger block sizes would provide the model with better information
with which to identify strategy use. An extension of the strategy analysis presented in this
manuscript might win both of these advantages simultaneously. Many strategy analyses
could be run with the same data, but variable block sizes. For example, the same data
could be analyzed three times with blocks made up of 25, 50, and 100 trials. Moreover,
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the same analysis could use each of 25, 50, and 100 trial blocks in the same analysis (as
actual strategy use surely changes much more irregularly than once every n trials). The
analyst could then report the extent to which these analyses agree, and the distribution of
model fits across the individual strategy analyses.
Two parameters in particular, learning rate and previous strategy use, would seem
to be obvious candidates for inclusion in future modeling. A virtue of the analyses
reported above is that they are memoryless – the strategy identification for a given block
is not dependent on any previous or future blocks. For questions that are fundamentally
focused on description, rather than on prediction of future trends in a specific animal’s
behavior, this feature maintains model sensitivity to what was often a dynamic shift from
cueless to single-cue responding. The results presented in Chapter 4 make clear, however,
that strategy identifications for consecutive blocks are very highly autocorrelated (Figure
4.7). This autocorrelation, known to the experimenter but not to the model, would ideally
be incorporated into the modeling process as an additional predictor of strategy use in a
block. Such an incorporation would do much to sharpen strategy identifications above the
rates of correct identification depicted in Figure 4.1.
Bayesian model selection, psychologist adoption and interpretation of Bayesian
techniques, and the tools for Bayesian mixture model specification and fitting have each
advanced precipitously in the previous decade. Many Bayesian techniques would
incorporate information from serialized blocks naturally via specification of a prior
probability that is then updated with observed data (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b). As an
ancillary benefit, estimation of strategy adherence rates would be incorporated into the
model by default and provide an additional dependent measure on which hypotheses
about strategy use and individual differences might be tested. Constraints would be
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required to ensure that the model retains sensitivity to new data, and does not dismiss
strategic responding because previous blocks were not strategic. Without these
constraints, the model might get “stuck” with a strategy that was highly evidenced in early
trials but was an inappropriate depiction of mature responding. With the proper
constraints in place, an evolved, Bayesian version of the present strategy analysis (akin to
the Bayesian strategy analysis of Lee, 2016, but on a much larger scale), could do much to
sharpen detection of strategy use in weather prediction and offer additional description
of its deployment.
A principal advantage to the strategy analysis technique used above is that it can
test an arbitrary number of strategy specifications against each other. Following Meeter
and colleagues (2006), the strategies specified above ostensibly included all those that
may reasonably have been employed by human participants. It remains possible,
however, that another specification might better capture monkeys’ (or humans’)
behaviors in the task than those represented in Table 4.1. Because of this reality, as well
as these results’ apparent suitability for future synthesis with allied data on individual
differences, the rich potential for alternative analysis strategies (Bayesian or otherwise),
and the more far-reaching virtues of transparent science, all data and code to run analyses
are publicly available in Open Science Foundation’s repositories.
The profound, consistent null result of single cue strategy use is not sufficient to
discriminate between more cognitive sources of the strong predisposition to single cues
or more perceptual ones. To both the researcher interested in why monkey strategy use is
not more like that of humans, and the allied researcher interested in what drives the
complexity of human strategy use, a design that can make this distinction remains a key
goal of future research. In much of the scholarship of comparative cognition, individual
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animals, and primates specifically, are exemplary in the most literal of senses. Each
individual evidences a unique suite of cognitive competencies and motivational
dispositions that are dictated in part by their species, but often to an equal or greater
degree by their other traits. In the series of experiments that comprises this dissertation
this individuality may have been true in the motivational sense, but, uncharacteristically,
not in the cognitive competencies evidenced by the animals. In the specific set of
cognitions required to complete weather prediction tasks monkeys have, to this point,
demonstrated that they are impressively of a kind. This result has held in spite of a
diversity of task manipulations of theoretical or hypothetical import. Such a monkey
monolith has few parallels in comparative psychology, and represents a fertile ground for
continued exploration of what procedural determinants and species differences drive this
unusual invariance.
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